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With increasing use of information and communication technologies (ICT), many 
organizations are outsourcing information security services to managed security service 
providers (MSSP). This project reports results on current practice and experiences with 
outsourced incident management services. The research was conducted as a case study 
performing a qualitative study of six large MSSPs, one emerging MSSP and an independent 
expert. The findings reveal multiple challenges that both customers and providers are 
currently facing, including suggestions for addressing them. This information will be useful 
for organizations looking to improve their practices. This research seeks to build awareness 
of the challenges posed by relying on outsourced services for incident management. It 
describes how these services are benefiting or affecting current incident management teams 
and some of the future needs of this field. Furthermore, it contributes with a categorization of 
the services offered by some of the most significant MSSPs in the market. 
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Chapter1Introduction
Today’s evolving Information and Communication Technology (ICT) environment
requires connecting not only new applications and devices, but also new providers
and partners. As a result the ICT environment has been gradually outsourced to
third parties, expanding the security perimeter. Some organizations are moving their
ICT infrastructure to the cloud, where the options for incident response are either
null or depending on third parties, with legal and accountability issues. Moreover,
attackers (motivated, skilled and well-funded) are discovering new attack vectors,
while defenders have to take care of multiple technologies and keeping them and
themselves updated.
Incidents will occur sooner or later. What is important is to detect, contain
and eradicate the incident quickly and effectively to reduce the impact to the
organization. However, organizations under-invest on prevention and suffer from
scarcity of skilled personnel. An evolving threat landscape and the lack of expertise
in many organizations require new strategies to balance the need to manage incidents
effectively.
Some companies provide outsourced monitoring and management of security
devices and systems. Outsourcing incident management services seems to be a cost-
effective way to satisfy some requirements from both small and large organizations.
These kinds of providers are able to see a big picture view, by using the knowledge
acquired by their solutions to their advantage.
1.1 Objectives
This thesis project aims to identify current practices to perform incident management
through outsourced services. The outcome of this study will develop new awareness
of the challenges posed by relying on outsourced services for incident management,
such as prevention, detection and response. The research questions are:
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– How do outsourced incident management services benefit or affect current
incident management teams?
– How are roles, responsibilities and penalties described in service level agreements
between a customer and the outsourced incident management service’s provider?
– Which challenges are experienced during the implementation of these services
in incident management?
– What are the future needs for outsourced incident management and what is
lacking from the industry to make it real?
1.2 Outline
Chapter 2 introduces qualitative research and what it involves, the process of selection
for the research method and the case study process followed in the present study. A
background study of outsourced incident management services is presented in Chapter
3, where related published standards and guidelines are described and analyzed. This
chapter presents a comparative summary of incident handling phases in standards
and guidelines; it also describes the relationship between incident management,
incident handling and incident response. Furthermore this chapter describes the
MSSP categorization and the incident management services offered by the most
significant providers in the market. Finally, Chapter 3 describes briefly situational
awareness, the OODA loop, the intrusion kill chain model and their relationship to
incident management.
Chapter 4 describes the organizations and experts in the case study. The findings
from the case study are detailed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 discusses the findings
described in Chapter 5 and compares them with the background study described
in Chapter 3. Chapter 7 presents the conclusions from this project and introduces
future work.
Appendix A contains the request for participation in research project provided
to the case study participants. In Appendix B the Interview guide can be found.
Appendix C includes the notification receipt provided by the Norwegian Social
Science Data Services. Appendix D contains the paper submitted to CloudCom 2015
conference.
Chapter2Method
The goal of this project is to identify the challenges on relying on outsourced services
for incident management when incident management is performed in practice.
This chapter describes the research method used to approach the current experi-
ences, researched in this thesis, as well as the reasons for selecting this method.
2.1 Qualitative research
Qualitative research covers a set of techniques which seek to understand a phenomenon,
exploring specific issues and finding answers to questions. Merriam [Mer14] describes
four key characteristics to understand the nature of qualitative research: ”the focus
is on process, understanding, and meaning; the researcher is the primary instrument
of data collection and analysis; the process is inductive; and the product is richly
descriptive.”
Robson [Rob11] describes the key features of qualitative research as:
– Findings are not based upon numerical form but verbally.
– Context is important to understand the phenomena.
– Situations are based on the experience of those involved.
– The design of the research is an ongoing process.
– It has a holistic perspective and generalizations are not a major concern.
– It occurs in an ordinary framework.
– Does not require large-scale research in terms of persons or situations.
3
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Figure 2.1: Research methods, based on [Yin13]
2.2 Choice of method
Selecting the appropriate research method can be done using three criteria: form of
research question, whether there are requirements of control over behavioural events
and whether the study focuses on contemporary events. Yin [Yin13] explains that
the first and most important criterion to select the appropriate research method is to
identify the form of research question being asked. Then a further distinction among
the research methods is based on control over behavioural events and the focus on
contemporary events.
In this project, the form of the research question is a so-called ”how” question,
as presented in Section 1.1. A further distinction among experiment, history and
case study was determined by having no control over behavioural events and by
focusing on contemporary events, since the project aims to identify current practices.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the various research methods with the three criteria to determine
the appropriate research method. As a result, case study appears as the most suitable
method for this project, which is emphasized in the figure.
2.3 Case study
A case study is described by Yin [Yin13] as ”an empirical inquiry that investigates a
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when
the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident”. It is
performed to study a real-world case gaining a deep understanding looking at it in
context, relying on multiple sources of evidence and taking advantage of theoretical
propositions to lead data collection and analysis. A case study includes 6 phases
that can be repeated until the goal is achieved. The phases are plan, design, prepare,
collect, analyze and share. See Figure 2.2
The plan phase is related to establishing the research questions and choosing the
case study as the research method.
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Figure 2.2: Case study research process, based on [Yin13]
The design phase consists of building a hypothesis about what is to be studied,
linking the initial questions to the final outcome or conclusions and suggesting what
should be considered within the scope of study. The purpose of this phase is to
prevent the collection of data that do not focus on the initial research questions.
The collection phase addresses the importance of collecting evidence from multiple
sources. Findings obtained from at least two different sources, providing corroborative
discoveries are likely to be more accurate and convincing. The interview is described
by Yin [Yin13] as ”one of the most important sources of case study information”.
The analysis phase involves reshaping the data in a preliminary sense or using a
general strategy to identify what data is valuable and how should it be analyzed to
extract observational conclusions.
The share phase consists of the preparation and edition of the case study report,
in order to produce and expose the findings and conclusions.
2.4 Qualitative interviews
Hesse et al. [HBL10] define the qualitative interview as the process to ”seek knowledge
from the responder’s point of view”. To get in-depth and detailed information about
the responder’s experience, a qualitative interview is flexible and makes use of open
questions.
There are several types of qualitative interview; the one selected for this study is
referred in the literature [Wen01] [MN07] as semi-structured interview.
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In a semi-structured interview, the researcher prepares, in advance, some questions
which are designed to be open. This script is prepared having in mind that the
responder’s responses can’t be predicted, demanding some improvisation for the
subsequent questions during the interview. Semi-structured interviews must be
planned and prepared beforehand; they demand discipline and creativity during the
session, and require time for analysis and evaluation after the session. The interview
guide used as a sketch can be found in Appendix B.
The interviews were performed via Skype or using conference bridges. All of
them were done in a limited period of time. During the interviews, the responders
addressed some initial questions, in order to initiate a process shift into a fluid
conversation around the main topic of the interview and obtaining more elaborative
answers
2.5 Document study
In order to enhance the knowledge gained through the interviews, relevant standards,
guidelines, frameworks and academic literature was studied. This was a critical factor
to develop a categorization of the outsourced incident management services and to
address their challenges during the analysis phase.
2.6 Qualitative data analysis
There are various approaches to qualitative data analysis (See Table 2.1). The one
selected for this study is referred to in the literature [HBL10] [Tho06] as the inductive
approach. An inductive approach provides a set of procedures to condense raw data
into a summary and establish links between the latter and the research objectives, in
order to produce reliable and valid findings.
During the qualitative data analysis process the data analysis was guided by the
research questions. The raw data was prepared in a common format and read in
detail to get familiar with its content. Then a set of categories, based on key themes,
were developed from the raw data. Thereafter a continuous revision and refinement
of the category system was performed, including contradictory points of view and
new insights. Finally, the framework containing the most important categories was
constructed.
The findings of each case are presented in Chapter 5. A summary based on the
experiences revealed by the analysis is given in Chapter 6.
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General
inductive
approach
Grounded
theory
Discourse
analysis
Phenomenology
Analytic
strategies
and
questions
What are
the core
meanings
evident in
text,
relevant to
evaluation
or research
objectives?
To generate
or discover
theory
using open
and axial
coding and
theoretical
sampling.
Concerned
with talk
and texts
as social
practices
and their
rethorical or
augmentative
organization.
Seeks to
uncover the
meaning that
lives within
experience and
to convey felt
understanding
in words.
Outcome
of
analysis
Themes or
categories
most
relevant
to research
objectives
identified.
A theory
that
includes
themes or
categories.
Multiple
meanings of
language
and text
identified
and
described.
A description
of lived
experiences.
Presentation
of
findings
Description
of most
important
themes.
Description
of theory
that
includes
core
themes.
Descriptive
account of
multiple
meanings
in text.
A coherent
story or
narrative about
the experience.
Table 2.1: Qualitative analysis approaches [Tho06]
2.7 Participants
The participant organizations is this study are transnational organizations selected
based on the managed security service provider’s (MSSP) market presence. The
participant further described as Expert 1 was selected due to his expertise and
experience in incident management, incident handling and incident response through
different sectors as well as his role as instructor in a private company that specializes
in security training.
A description of the participating organizations is presented in chapter 4.
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2.8 Ethical considerations
The purpose of the research was informed to the participants during the interview
request. Then each participant received a request for participation form asking
for their consent, describing exactly what were they participating in and how their
personal information would be handled. The request for participation form provided
to the case study participants can be found in Appendix A.
The participation was voluntary with the possibility to withdraw at any moment.
All information that could lead to the identification of individuals or organizations
was anonymized or deleted. All participating organizations mentioned in this project
were named using alias names. A secure erasure was performed to all recordings
when the project was concluded.
The project was reported to the Norwegian Social Science Data Services.1 See
Appendix C.
2.9 Methodological challenges
A small number of organizations were studied due to time restrictions. The data
collection process was performed through interviews. Interviews require active
listening and formulating questions. However, posing ”why” questions during the
interview could lead to defensiveness from the participants. The challenges with the
interviews should be considered. The ones present during this research were:
– Finding the right participant organizations.
– Requesting for remote interviews to transnational enterprises in a short range
of time makes it difficult to get them.
– Re-scheduling interviews due to last minute difficulties in the participant’s job
duties.
– Limited time for the interviews makes difficulties to produce a fluid conversation
around the main topic of the interview in order to obtain more elaborative
answers.
– Limited time for the interviews could lead to leave out relevant information.
– Participants were interviewed remotely at their offices or meeting rooms, dis-
tractions such as emails, phone calls, text messages and more could have been
present.
1http://www.nsd.uib.no/nsd/english/
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Specific challenges related to the interview process for this case study were:
– Finding contact information from people inside the organization involved with
tasks related to outsourced incident management services.
– Not all participants accepted to be recorded, which led to a challenging collection
of data in those cases.
– Arranging interviews in different time zones.
– In most of the cases, the participants provided answers exalting their business
model as a result of their economic interest to attract more customers.

Chapter3Background study
This chapter presents significant background information in relation to outsourced
incident management services. An overview of relevant academic literature is intro-
duced.
3.1 Related Work
The term incident management refers to the actions and mechanisms used to manage
information security incidents. It is used to describe the collection of tasks involved
with the incident response life-cycle. These tasks include planning and preparation,
detection and reporting, assessment and decision, responding, and learning to prevent
future incidents.
Different standards, guidelines and frameworks have direct and indirect remarks
on incident management. Those that are most notable among the information security
community are: NIST SP1 800-61 [CMGS12], ISO/IEC2 27035 [ISO11], ENISA3
Good Practice Guide for Incident Management [MRS10] and ITIL4 [Bri07]. These
standards, guidelines and frameworks will be described in section 3.2.
Siepmann [Sie13] describes outsourcing as contracting out services, previously
performed internally, to a third party. Both the third party and the organization
contracting out the services take part in a contractual agreement that involves
payments, and exchange of services.
A great amount of academic literature related to incident management and
managed security services (MSS) has been published. Nevertheless, the literature
focused on outsourced incident management services is scarce.
1National Institute for Standards and Technology Special Publication
2International Organization for Standardization/International Electro-technical Commission
3European Network and Information Security Agency
4Information Technology Infrastructure Library
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Siepmann [Sie13] presents an analysis on security and privacy impacts when
outsourcing Information Technology (IT) processes as well as recommendations on
outsourcing preparation.
Sherwood [She97] studied the concerns regarding security of information within
outsourced settings. The study presents a strategy to manage information security
on outsourced technical services.
The study performed by Tøndel et al. [TLJ14] on current practices and experiences
with incident management, identified outsourcing scenarios as one of the challenges
for incident management. In accordance with their study, there is a need for
improved understanding of the challenges of incident response in outsourcing scenarios
particularly when several suppliers are serving the same customer.
Maj et al. [MRS10] discuss the outsourcing of incident management from the
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) point of view. They suggest hiring
the right people to guide the outsourcing process since it is a challenging project
that should not be underestimated. Maj et al. recommend keeping control over the
incident handling services and not outsource those elements of incident handling that
provide control such as incident reports, registration, triage (including verification and
classification) and the overall coordination of incident resolution. Some of the reasons
given to outsource incident management related services are [MRS10] [AGM+03] :
– Cost.
– Lack of in-house skills.
– Physically hardened facilities with state-of-the-art infrastructure.
– Enterprise-wide management of security strategy.
– Access to global information on threats and countermeasures.
– Global prosecution on cyber-attacks and data breaches.
– Service performance 24x7.
– Particular services that you might not want to provide yourself.
In a previous work [Rey14], the author described that there is a need for research
around the topic of outsourced incident management since it is a recent trend. The
current available literature does not address it.
Siepmann’s work [Sie13] addresses management of information security incidents
but his comments only consider on managing incidents in outsourcing settings and not
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managed by a trusted third party outsourcing the services. Sherwood’s study on man-
agement of security on outsourcing contracts [She97], does not have an assessment on
incident management. Tøndel et al.’s study on current practices and experiences with
incident management [TLJ14] do not describe any outsourced incident management
experiences or practices. The good practice guide for incident management published
by Maj et al. [MRS10] only addresses outsourcing of incident management from
the CERT’s perspective. The author’s previous work on incident management in
outsourcing [Rey14], does not address the outsourced incident management model.
The present layout of incident management is trying to reach the capabilities
to address today’s evolving threat landscape and the gradual changes on the ICT
infrastructure moving to the cloud computing. Through the process of studying the
related work, the need to study the outsourced incident management services became
evident.
The term CERT was used for the first time by the Computer Emergency Response
Team – Coordination Center (CERT-CC) at Carnegie Mellon University. Some teams
around the world took the CERT term and other teams used the term Computer
Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) to point out the task of handling computer
security incidents instead of other technical support work. The terms CERT, CSIRT,
Incident Response Team (IRT), Computer Incident Response Team (CIRT) and
Security Emergency Response Team (SERT) have been used interchangeably in the
literature to refer to teams that aim to mitigate the impact of a potential major
information security incident.
3.2 Standards and guidelines
This section introduces some standards containing information regarding incident
management. Each one of them is summarized. However, all the technical details of
each option are not presented, neither which options are best is addressed, as that
highly depends on the use case.
3.2.1 NIST Special Publication 800-61
This standard [CMGS12] aims to assist organizations in mitigating risks from com-
puter security incidents by providing guidance on establishing incident response
capabilities. It includes guidelines on building incident management capabilities and
the interaction with external parties, such as vendors or Computer Security Incident
Response Team (CSIRT).
NIST SP 800-61 describes in detail the four major phases of the incident response
life cycle. These phases are (See Figure 3.1):
14 3. BACKGROUND STUDY
Figure 3.1: NIST Incident response life cycle, based on [CMGS12]
– Preparation.
– Detection and Analysis.
– Containment, Eradication and Recovery.
– Post-Incident Activity.
Preparation This phase involves everything that is needed to establish an incident
response capability and to prevent incidents. Even though the latter is not a typical
task for an incident response team (IRT) it is fundamental to the success of the
organization’s incident response capability. Preparation activities involve development
of policies, procedures and response plans, provisioning tools and resources that
may be valuable during incident handling as well as having multiple (separate and
different) communication and coordination mechanisms. Prevention activities involve
practices for securing networks, systems and applications. Some recommended
practices are risk assessments, host security, network security, malware prevention
and user awareness.
Detection and analysis Organizations should implement mechanisms to detect
incidents and determine the potential impact that these may have. The detection
might be the most challenging part of the incident response process. This phase
involves automated and human detection capabilities. The guideline describes two
categories of signs of an incident: precursors and indicators. These are defined as: ”A
precursor is a sign that an incident may occur in the future. An indicator is a sign
that an incident may have occurred or may be occurring now”. All the information
collected and reported during this phase can’t be guaranteed to be accurate. It
should be evaluated to determine if it is legitimate in order to use it for making
assessments and decisions. When the IRT suspects that an incident has occurred,
it should document and time-stamp every step taken from detection to resolution,
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since such information could be used as evidence in the case that legal prosecution
is pursued. Incidents should be prioritized based on relevant factors, in order to
handle them accordingly. Some factors that can be used to prioritize the incidents
include: functional impact of the incident, information impact of the incident and
recoverability from the incident. Combining the information from the first and second
mentioned factors is possible to determine the business impact of the incident.
Containment, Eradication and Recovery Containment is important to prevent
that an incident increases damage. It provides time to establish an ad-hoc remediation
strategy. Containment strategies differ depending on the type of incident. Once
an incident has been contained, eradication may be required to remove elements
related to the incident. For some incidents eradication could be performed during
recovery. In recovery, systems are restored to normal operations and vulnerabilities
are remediated to mitigate similar incidents.
Post-incident activity This phase is a very important part of the incident re-
sponse but usually omitted. It consists of analyzing the incident, including the actions
taken in order to generate lessons learned. Lessons learned meetings should focus
on revealing weaknesses during the recovery, successful approaches to mitigate the
incident, corrective actions to prevent future similar incidents and resources needed
to detect, analyze and mitigate incidents in the future. The purpose of this phase is
to improve the security measures and the incident response life-cycle.
3.2.2 ISO/IEC 27035:2011 Information security incident
management
This standard [ISO11] provides guidance to incident management. It offers a struc-
tured approach to deal with incidents including planning, detecting, responding and
thereafter extracting lessons learnt. ISO/IEC 27035:2011 presents five phases with
recommended activities. These phases are (See Figure 3.2):
– Plan and Prepare.
– Detection and Reporting.
– Assessment and Detection.
– Responses.
– Lessons learnt.
The standard ISO/IEC 27035:2011 aims to assist organizations in satisfying the
requirements for establishing, implementing, maintaining and continually improving
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Figure 3.2: ISO 27035 Incident management phases, based on [ISO11]
an Information Security Management System (ISMS) specified in the ISO/IEC
27001:2013 – Information security management [ISO13a].
ISO/IEC 27035:2011 provides guidelines on the implementation of good practices
on information security management presented in the standard ISO/IEC 27002:2013
Code of practice for information security controls [ISO13b].
3.2.3 ENISA - Good Practice Guide for Incident Management
ENISA’s guide [MRS10] provides guidelines for security incident management. It
provides recommendations on the creation of a CERT and assists on preparing its
mission, constituency, responsibility, mandate organizational framework and the type
of services, in terms of the incident management process, that can deliver.
This guide highlights the incident handling process, and provides related infor-
mation on roles, workflows and policies. ENISA’s guide pays no attention to the
preparation phase and focuses on the incident handling process composed by four
phases: detection, triage, analysis and incident response.
The relationship among incident management and incident handling is illustrated
in Figure 3.3
3.2.4 The ITIL Framework
The ITIL framework [Bri07] is a source of good practice for service management
that focuses on aligning IT services with the needs of the organization. The main
goals of the incident management lifecycle are to reestablish a normal service as
fast as possible and to reduce unfavorable impact on business operations. During
the incident management process, resources are assigned to different activities such
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Figure 3.3: ENISA Incident management and incident handling relationship, based
on [MRS10]
as identification, registration, categorization, prioritization, diagnosis, escalation,
investigation, resolution, recovery, and incident closure, in order to mitigate and
minimize the impact of incidents. The incident management process can be triggered
by incident reports coming from diverse sources. See Figure 3.4.
The incident management process can be summarized in five phases: Identification
and Logging, Classification and Prioritization, Investigation and Diagnosis, Resolution
and Recovery, and Incident closure. See Figure 3.5.
The problem management process is a proactive and reactive process that involves
preventing problems and resulting incidents from happening as well as eliminating
recurring incidents. The problem management process is depicted in Figure 3.6.
In order to differentiate incident management and problem management it is
important to describe that a problem is the underlying source of one or more incidents,
whereas an incident always remains an incident. Its impact or priority may increase
but it will never become a problem. Therefore, the main goal of problem management
is to prevent problems and incidents, eliminate repeating incidents and minimize the
impact of incidents that cannot be prevented. The incident management goal is to
handle the incidents.
18 3. BACKGROUND STUDY
Figure 3.4: ITIL Incident management detailed, based on [Bri07]
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Figure 3.5: ITIL Incident management, based on [Bri07]
Figure 3.6: ITIL Problem management, based on [Bri07]
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ITIL does not present the activities related to planning and preparation as part
of the incident management process or the problem management process because it
has reactive approach.
A comparative summary of the standards and guidelines described previously is
presented in Table 3.1.
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3.3 Incident management
There is a lack of consistency in defining incident management across the standards
and guidelines as well as in the information security literature. The terms inci-
dent management, incident handling and incident response are in some cases used
interchangeably. However, these terms have a different scope.
Incident management is part of a comprehensive security programme for infor-
mation security governance [MRS10] [BBC06]. Killcrece et al. [KKRZ05] emphasize
that incident management is not purely an IT issue, but a wide overview of the
organization’s security, risk and IT management functions. Alberts et al. [ADK+04]
explains that incident management encompasses incident handling, incident response
and a larger set of activities such as vulnerability handling, artefact handling, se-
curity awareness training as well as other proactive services and security quality
management services.
Chichonski et al. [CMGS12] and Maj et al. [MRS10] present incident handling
as a whole lifecyle where incident response is one of its phases. Incident response
is an organized approach to react to a security breach or attack. The goal is to
contain, eradicate and recover from the situation in a way that limits damage and
reduces recovery time and costs. Figure 3.7 explains the relationship between incident
management, incident handling and incident response. Where incident management
has a broad scope of the organization’s security functions and one of these functions
is incident handling. Incident handling is a lifecycle from planning and preparation
to the post-incident activites. The incident handling lifecycle contains incident
response as one of its phases. Figure 3.7 is based on [ADK+04], [MRS10], [ISO11]
and [CMGS12].
3.4 Incident management models
In a previous work [Rey14], the author classified the incident management models
according to the organization’s capabilities, human resources and expertise (See
Table 3.2). The author described in that work that the outsourced incident man-
agement model is usually followed by organizations focused on their core activities
or by organizations looking for cost reductions. The focus of this project is on the
outsourced incident management model.
The incident management could be partially or fully outsourced in this model.
Selecting a partially outsourced approach could be based on the lack of certain
expertise or when is more convenient to use a third party to provide a particular
service. On the other hand, fully outsourcing incident management would be an
option for those organizations that want to focus uniquely and completely on their
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Figure 3.7: Incident Management, Incident Handling and Incident Response rela-
tionship
Capabilities
At organization side At provider side Outsourced
Execution
Full-time Full-time Partially outsourced
Part-time Part-time Fully outsourced
Virtual team Virtual team
Table 3.2: Incident management models [Rey14]
core services and rather outsource anything else.
3.5 Managed Security Service Provider
Outsourcing incident management services is not an option that all organizations
would consider, since it may be perceived as providing control and access to the
digital assets. However, outsourcing incident management services is all about a
security partnership with one or more trusted third parties.
Managed Security Service Providers (MSSP) supply organizations with expert
teams and systems, improvement in performance, reduction in capital investment
for technology and resources, and meticulous activities to exhibit to auditors and
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Capabilities Managed Security Service Providers (MSSPs)
Largest MSSPs
(Enterprise-class)
Emerging MSSPs Smaller firms
serving the small
business market
Security Operation
Centers (SOCs)
Multiple SOCs
in multiple
geographic
locations
One or two SOCs Single SOC
Technology
Proprietary or
significantly
enhanced
technology
Significantly
enhanced
technology
No threat
intelligence
services unless
reselling another
company’s service
Portfolio
Full portfolio of
standard services
Full portfolio of
services
Narrow portfolio
of services
Language support
Multi-language
support
One or two
languages
One language
Table 3.3: Managed Security Service Provider categories, based on [FH13]
regulators. A MSSP hosts, deploys and manages a security infrastructure, including
remote and local security control while providing information security services.
Depending on the contracted services, MSSPs are able to provide support to the
organization or (if existent) the organization’s incident management team to manage
incidents and to supplement or support the existing security infrastructure.
Ferrara and Hayes [FH13] categorized the MSSP in three categories, based on
the size and capabilities of the firm. The first category involves the largest providers,
also referred as enterprise-class. These MSSPs provide multiple security operation
centres (SOCs) in multiple geographic locations, proprietary or significantly enhanced
technology, full portfolio of standard services and multi-language support. The second
category has the emerging MSSPs. These MSSPs have one or two SOCs, significantly
enhanced technology, full portfolio of services and language support on one or two
languages. Finally, the third category includes many smaller firms that serve the
small business market. These companies have a single SOC, no threat intelligence
services unless reselling another company’s service, a narrow portfolio of services and
support on a single language. See Table 3.3.
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3.6 Managed Security Services
Managed Security Service Providers (MSSPs) provide a wide range of security
services. Allen et al. [AGM+03] describe that the range of services, offered by
the providers, differs in their ability to meet organization’s security requirements,
including, the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of information assets critical
to the organization’s mission. However, the current range of services offered varies
according to the provider’s ability to offer business and technical value.
There is no agreement on the type or description of the services being offered. Most
of the providers offer similar or identical services, often using the same technology.
However, each provider uses its own terminology to use a sales strategy based on
differentiators. Throughout the literature [AGM+03], [ZXW09], [FH13], different
lists of MSSP services can be found. However those services are not categorized.
Schneier [Sch02] stated that ”The field is so confusing that even the industry analysts
can’t agree on how to categorize the services offered”.
Deshpande [Des05] and Ding [DYY05] each presented a categorization of the
existent services at the time of their publications, but these categorizations are
outdated and do not include many of the current services.
The following categorization is based on the services offered by some the most
significant MSSPs in the North American market. The services are categorized in
two main categories: Security IT outsourcing (ITO) and business process outsourcing
(BPO). ITO services are performed commonly by MSSP’s offshore locations. These
services belong to the subcategory ”Security enforcement & managed protection” and
include managed protection services, cloud security, log management, database secu-
rity, mobile device and machine to machine (M2M) security, and encryption services.
BPO offerings are more refined and require robust process integration between the
client and the vendor. BPO offerings are sub-categorized in exposure management,
threat management and incident handling, identity and access management, risk and
compliance management. Examples of services belonging to these subcategories can
be found in Figure 3.8
The list of managed security services is expanding as demand for new security
technology emerges. Table 3.4 contains a summary of the services offered currently
by some of the most significant MSSPs.
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Figure 3.8: Managed Security Services
Service Description
Managed
protection
service
24/7 monitoring of the perimeter network traffic through
device management, such as IDS/IPS, firewall (traditional,
UTM, nextgeneration, web application). Endpoint
management providing automated patching for physical and
virtual endpoints. Server management services including
server protection firewall, server protection IPS and server
antimalware. Web gateway management to protect the
network from malicious threats through services such as
gateway and enterprise client antivirus, email security, proxy
servers and web content filtering. Netflow monitoring,
which provides an automated collection and analysis of netflow
data from the IP backbone network to discover indicators
of compromise (IOC). Denial of service (DoS) and
distributed denial of service (DDoS) protection to detect and
divert potentially malicious traffic away from the network.
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Service Description
Cloud security Security solutions that can be quickly deployed, fitting the
cloud computing model delivering customer cloud security,
cloud shared security and cloud provider security.
Log
management
Managed security information and event management
(SIEM) to monitor logs, correlate rule-sets, reviewing
potential incidents and providing escalation of high-risk
incidents. Log retention to collect and store logs generated
everyday by critical information assets.
Database
security
Database security protects databases against compromises of
their confidentiality, integrity and availability, uncovering
configuration mistakes, access control issues, missing patches
or any other combination of settings that could leak to data
leakage, unauthorized modification of data and other attacks.
Mobile device
and machine
to machine
(M2M)
security
Implementation of security strategies to take advantage of
the benefits of mobility. Managing and securing the network
of connected machines, devices, data and applications.
Encryption
services
Digital certificates and PKI-based connection to extend
recognition and public trust.
Vulnerability
management
Internal and external vulnerability scanning assessment to
find vulnerabilities identifying security liabilities across the
network infrastructure, hosts and endpoints. Application
defense and security assessment to find application
vulnerabilities before someone else does it. Penetration
testing services to detect, address vulnerabilities and
uncover problems before they become serious. Application
security code review to audit the source code for an
application to validate that the proper security controls are
present and the application works as intended.
Data Loss
Prevention
Evaluation of the organization’s data, classification based on
its value and implementation of Data Loss Prevention
(DLP) strategies to quantify risk and provide justification
for improving security practices based on the value of the
data and resources.
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Service Description
Threat
management
Global threat intelligence providing in-depth analysis of
emerging threats and zero-day vulnerabilities. Malware
analysis and reverse engineering to understand the threat, its
behavior and its impact to the organization, when a malicious
code of an unknown type has affected the organization
environment. Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) detection
and protection through and active and layered defense model.
Incident
handling
Emergency response services to provide support when a
security breach occurs. Incident Response Plan development
capturing roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders
across the organization, preparing incident response
processes and establishing communication flows and
notification procedures. Digital forensics investigations to
determine the root causes of incidents and provide
evidence-based security protocols to prevent them from
happening again. E-discovery services to preserve potential
evidence during investigations avoiding potential legal matters
and protecting the organization’s reputation. Table top
exercises to assess the response performance to threat
scenarios.
Access
management
services
Access management services to provide appropriate rights and
permissions accross systems and applications.
Universal
identity
services
Verification of user identities before accessing the IT
infrastructure issuing credential to users quickly for secure
login and access. Providing secure remote access to sensitive
data to customers, partners and employees using mobile
devices.
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Service Description
Governance,
risk and
compliance
Compliance monitoring measures compliance to a technical
risk model by monitoring event logs not for intrusions, but
change management. Risk management to establish critical
baselines, evaluate security controls, identify regulatory
holes, uncover process weaknesses and develop
comprehensive strategies. Supply chain security services to
validate that applicable laws and regulations issued by
applicable governments and industry standards organizations
are observed and complied. Consulting services provide
tailored assistance in the assessment of business risks,
security and security policies and processes development,
and security product integration. Security awareness training
to provide employees with a robust core of security
knowledge to make the most informed decisions possible.
Table 3.4: Managed Security Services description
3.7 Situational Awareness
Endsley [End88] defined situational awareness as ”the perception of the elements
in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their
meaning and the projection of their status in the near future”.
Situational Awareness is a core element to identify and detect threats early in
any incident management effort. Situational awareness has the ability to be dynamic
and respond to new and evolving threat models. In order to respond intelligently to
the new threats, it is important to share data in near real time; and play an active
role in providing the knowledge, capability, and capacity to secure and monitor the
company assets.
Situational awareness has three phases: situation recognition, situation com-
prehension and situation projection. Barford et al. [BDD+10] and Albanese et al.
[AJ14] defined the aspects of each one of these phases. The first phase, situation
recognition, provides information about the status, attributes, and dynamics of rele-
vant elements within the environment. The phase situation recognition requires being
aware of the current situation and being aware of the quality and trustworthiness of
the collected situation awareness information items and the knowledge-intelligence
decisions derived from these information items. The final phase, situation compre-
hension, encompasses how people combine, interpret, store and retain information.
Situation comprehension involves being aware of the impact of the attack, being
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aware of the adversary behaviour and knowing why and how the current situation is
caused. Situation projection encompasses the ability to make predictions based on
the knowledge acquired through perception and comprehension. Situation projection
requires tracking how the situations evolve and assessing plausible futures of the
current situation.
Situational awareness aims to provide with the right information to everyone
involved with the incident management and the incident response team, whether
there are many incident responders and several compromised systems or one person
examining one compromised system.
Situational awareness capabilities are insufficient today. Jajodia et al. [JNK+11]
highlighted that there is lack of success on adapting to evolving networks and attacks,
inability to transform raw data into cyber-intelligence and inability for handling
uncertainty. A large number of alerts from network monitoring systems are often
ambiguous and erratic. Real threats need to be quickly recognizable, understanding
their potential impact in order to respond rapidly and accurately, mitigating them
and minimizing the impact.
3.8 OODA loop
The stages of situational awareness are similar to the decision making cycle Observe
Orient Decide Act (OODA) proposed by Boyd [Boy87]. The OODA loop is a
continuous process composed by four phases (See Figure 3.9). Observe requires to
collect data from the environment from relevant sources. The more that can be
observed the more the attack can be understood. Orient involves using logic, expertise
and learning to the data observed to understand what it means in context and enrich
the knowledge on the current incident. Decide is where options are determined and
the best course of action is taken. Act involves executing decisions effectively.
The OODA loop is a way to bring people, process and, technology together to
defend against the cyber-threats. Klein et al. [KTM11] proposed to align all the
different cyber-activities, related to the OODA loop in the cyber-defense context,
holistically.
Companies need a holistic approach to cyber security, integrating multiple facets
such as the threat actors, incident preparedness, legal counsel, anticipation of tomor-
row’s regulatory environment, compliance and a defensive strategy that continually
adapts to the adversaries capability and threat landscape. The threat landscape is
constantly changing and evolving, and companies have to monitor continuously for
new vulnerabilities, new attack techniques, and anomalous or suspicious activity that
might indicate a security incident is occurring. In the current cyber threat landscape,
3.9. INTRUSION KILL CHAIN MODEL 31
Figure 3.9: OODA loop
the OODA loop is an attractive framework for incident response management. When
the OODA loop is implemented correctly, it touches all critical parts of the business,
not just IT.
Gagnon et al. [GTK+10] describe that the OODA loop is used to achieve ”decision
superiority by making better decisions”. It facilitates the observation and analysis
enabling quick decisions and implementing new learnings in the next round.
3.9 Intrusion kill chain model
In addition, new techniques to defend from the unique aspects of the attack life-cycle
are in development. The ”intrusion kill chain” model, defined by Hutchins et al.
[HCA11], is a model for framing an incident response analysis capability. It describes
the phases in the development and deployment of a cyber-attack. These phases are
reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, command and
control and actions on objectives (See Figure 3.10).
The kill chain analysis provides information on defensive courses of action. De-
tecting and analysing before the exploitation phase in the kill chain and implementing
actions across it will change the defenders disadvantage of initiating response too
late, which typically occurs during the conventional incident response process.
The kill chain model is effective for understanding defender’s capabilities and
performance facing highly complex attack scenarios. By understanding an intrusion
and benefiting from intelligence during the early phases, defenders make the attackers
modify every phase of their attack impeding them to reuse their strategies and using
their persistence against them.
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Figure 3.10: Intrusion kill chain model
Through this model, defenders can develop resilient mitigations against intruders
and intelligently prioritize investment road maps to rectify any capability gaps. The
effect of this model is a more resilient security posture when defenders align enterprise
defensive capabilities to the specific model phases.
Chapter4Case Introductions
4.1 Case A
The organization studied in case A is an enterprise-class Managed Security Service
Provider. Throughout the rest of this project, the organization in this case will be
referred to as Organization A. The interviewees have a global public marketing role
for security services and an investigation field operator role respectively. The first
one has 6 years of experience with Organization A in the product marketing role.
The latter has over 10 years of experience performing incident response and digital
forensics.
4.2 Case B
The organization studied in case B is an enterprise-class MSSP. Throughout the rest
of this project, the organization in this case will be referred to as Organization B.
The interviewee has an account manager for service deliverables role and has over 17
years of experience with the organization through technical and management roles.
4.3 Case C
The organization studied in case C is an enterprise-class MSSP. Throughout the
rest of this project, the organization in this case will be referred to as Organization
C. The interviewee has a cyber security technologist role and has over 8 years of
experience performing cyber security consulting, running sales and participating on
managed security services’ delivery projects.
4.4 Case D
The organization studied in case D is an enterprise-class MSSP. Throughout the rest
of this project, the organization in this case will be referred to as Organization D.
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The interviewee has a director of incident response role and has over 25 years of
experience performing incident response.
4.5 Case E
The organization studied in case E is an enterprise-class MSSP. Throughout the rest
of this project, the organization in this case will be referred to as Organization E.
The interviewee has a director of cyber security services role.
4.6 Case F
The organization studied in case F is an enterprise-class MSSP. Throughout the rest
of this project, the organization in this case will be referred to as Organization F.
The interviewee has a security senior director role.
4.7 Case G
The organization studied in case G is an emerging MSSP. Throughout the rest of
this project, the organization in this case will be referred to as Organization G. The
interviewee is the manager of the threat intelligence and incident response team.
4.8 Expert 1
Throughout the rest of this project, the expert in this case will be referred to as
Expert 1. The interviewee is an independent security consultant with more than 15
years of industry experience managing and securing networks in both public and
private sector. He has instructed several training courses on penetration testing,
intrusion detection and management of incident response teams.
Chapter5Findings
This chapter presents findings from the case study. Each case is presented separately.
The collected data was prepared in a common format and categorized based on key
themes. The information presented here is presented as given in the interviews. The
quotations in this chapter are presented explicitly as given by the interviewees. The
findings are organized based on three different stages: pre-operation, operation and
post operation.
”Pre-operation”refers to the stage where an organization has not created a contract
with any provider to acquire incident management services. ”Operation” describes
the stage where there is a on going contract between the customer and the provider
to outsource any kind of incident management services. Finally, the ”Post-operation”
stage deals with a normal contract completion or an early termination.
5.1 Case A
This section describes findings from Case A, where the interviewees have a global
public marketing role for security services and an investigation field operator role.
Organization A is an enterprise-class Managed Security Service Provider.
5.1.1 Pre Operation
Organization A describes that the frequency of attacks and data breaches is increasing.
The time that it takes for the attacker to compromise and get into the system or get
to a piece of data that they want to get is very short. Minutes are usually what it
takes for an attacker to exploit vulnerabilities and get into a system. On the other
hand, the discovery phase, basically the victim’s time, to find out that it has been
breached is usually taking months or sometimes even longer. In other words there
are more attacks, it goes faster for the attacker to exploit and it takes longer for the
victim to actually find out the attack and handle it themselves. Cyber-attacks are
real, they are happening to everybody, no matter the industry. These attacks are
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serious because companies are losing money, reputation, valuable assets, and all of
this is crucial to their business. Therefore it is important that companies address
this.
Organization A highlights that companies wake up to the security problem usually
when either they have an incident or when the incident occurs to their competitor,
to an organization or a company that is in their market, or in a country nearby. The
companies hear about breaches in the news and then they think about not becoming
part of the statistics, not becoming part of the news, and start wondering about:
what can be done? How can they get protected against a certain attack that is in
the news? There is a small fraction of the companies that are a lot more secure,
such as financial services companies, governments or defense organizations that come
up with a totally different background. They are more security aware, are typically
deploying cutting edge security technology because it is simply necessary for them to
effectively run their business. However, for most of the companies, being breached or
attacked is what makes them look for what can be done about this issue. Those that
get burned do not always talk about their breaches; they should do it in order to
prevent other companies on the same market.
Some companies don’t know what they want to protect, other companies don’t
understand why they want to protect it. These kinds of companies are usually not
aware of what their threats are. Not all the companies have crossed this line since
security costs a lot of money but there is no refund.
“Decision makers are not computer scientists, they are business ori-
ented. Some of them think that if a breach cost them let’s say 10 million
but the latest security solution costs 20 million, not acquiring or contract-
ing it will then be a 10 million saving. They prefer to take the decision of
not setting the security controls in place because security does not bring
them money back.”
Regarding the outsourced incident management services, Organization A describes
that there is a lot of different stuff out there and everybody is talking about it
differently. Some companies get an independent view, through a third party, of the
players that are in the space to help them understand what their strengths and
weaknesses are, and what might be suitable for their company to a certain extent. As
a result, they create short lists of vendors that provide these kinds of services. After
talking to different vendors, the companies get to a stage where it is not just about
price, it is not just about the actual product or service to be delivered but in reality
is about what is being delivered actually suits the company the best and it helps to
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give them the peace of mind and the protection that is relevant and necessary for
them.
Some companies have all sorts of tools in place that effectively gives them the
information to be aware of and see what to expect from an attack, depending on
the industry size and security awareness they have, but they are not viewing the
logs or they are using the tools wrong. They are not monitoring them, they are
not thinking about what a certain attack pattern can mean or they are not really
customizing the tools for their company. This is because they often don’t have the
experience or they don’t want to do it, therefore, they prefer to outsource these
services. Companies typically don’t want to focus on that, they want to focus on
whatever is their business, what they are making money with, but not necessarily
security.
Organization A describes that there are some MSSP’s that help customers to
manage devices and some other security services. Nowadays, there are so many
logs coming from all sorts of tools. Customers in general really have a hard time
aggregating and finding out what is admissible, what is not a risk for them and what,
in a series of attacks, can harm them in a big way. There are also some MSSP’s that
offer different types of managed security services that not just manage devices but
really help to monitor and analyze the incidents, manage the intelligence and the
information that is gathered by the customer, the information that is gathered by
the provider about what is going on in the world in terms of attacks, and the one
that is available on the network to recognize and intercept an attack when there are
indicators of compromise before it actually does harm.
“It is important to get the combination right, to have access to all
the information and intelligence, and have the tools, the knowledge and
experience to understand what is there when you look at it.”
Organization A’s mindset, regarding the acquisition of a new customer that is
switching its outsourced incident management services from one provider to another,
is to help the customer the most and the best. Therefore the new provider needs
to act as close and connected with the customer and with the previous provider as
possible. The difficulty relies on understanding the business of the new customer,
and on creating a trusted relationship. Understanding the business of the customer
requires learning about the infrastructure that the new customer has, understanding
what are the critical assets and what does the customer wants to protect. Building a
trusted relationship between provider and customer is something that is done over
time, in some cases years, over successful protection in terms of attacks and is built
by and through the people and through the experts that interact with the customer.
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5.1.2 Operation
Organization A considers that getting outsourced incident management services
might become an issue for some companies with internal incident teams, because at
the end of the day internal people are being replaced with a service from an external
provider. As a result, there is reduction of staff, but the company gets a better
and cheaper service from somebody else. This is the same effect as when companies
outsource any service like payroll, financial services, cleaning services, etc., because
companies tend to want to focus on their primary business.
Organization A emphasizes that in order to stop attacks before they do damage,
customers should be able to understand what to look for, to have the appropriate
tools and the experience to recognize certain patterns or types of incident, as well
as to have the tools to alert about an attack before it actually does damage. These
are the things that most customers struggle with, to stay aware of what the attack
patterns are out there, to know what is going on in a global landscape and then to
become proactive.
In some cases Organization A has detected through their incident management
services some indicators of compromise (IOC) that indicate that something might
be happening in the customer’s network and as a consequence alert the customer,
depending on the severity of the problem, Organization A might insist on taking
actions or asking for authorization to investigate more, depending on the service level
agreement.
“Sometimes an incident can go on for a long period of time. In some
cases we (the provider) can have multiple times where we go back and
forth. At some point the customer realizes that there is something that is
not perceivable by itself, something that its software and tools were not
alerting on. Then, the customer recognizes that is clueless about what to
do in order to contain this problem. The customer doesn’t know what to
look for, and often time is very dependent on us (the provider) to get the
issue resolved to get the attack stopped.”
According to Organization A, the combination of: multiple sources of intelligence,
tools, the quality of the input that a provider can have access to and the experience
have as a result a more mature response and less false positives for the customer.
Customers want to be protected against attacks or incidents that go after valuable
assets and/or that are potentially damaging for them. These events are the ones that
customers want to detect and there is where the provider’s experience, intelligence
and the quality of tools make a difference.
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One of the challenges during the response is when the MSSPs are providing a
service to a new customer that has never been in touch with the provider before, and
the customer is looking for an incident management service as a consequence of a
breach. There, the provider’s incident response team sees the company’s infrastructure
for the first time. It needs to help very quickly and effectively, it is required to
analyze the network, understand the data flow and the infrastructure. Once they find
the breach, they have to work their way through the breach and through the systems,
if cloud services are involved or the systems are located in different countries then it
takes some more time to send the human resources to get the logs, if required.
Data breaches and cybercrimes are not only technical, companies can’t fight them
with only technical aspects. Technology is only one factor, but there are many more.
That is why Organization A has ex law enforcement personnel, computer scientists,
auditors, lawyers, etc., who can think outside the box about a breach.
When the customers have an incident and the MSSP’s incident response team
needs to get to the company, it might face different scenarios. One of them is that
the customer has no incident management team. Then, if the company has no
security preparedness there might be communication conflicts, because they might
lack internal communication or knowledge about who to contact, how to do it or
even long delays because the IT personnel handling the incident might not have top
management support. On the other hand, the customer might have its own incident
response team that would require from the provider’s team only support with more
man power, or support with specific tasks such as reverse engineering of malware. It
depends on the local incident management team’s capabilities.
Those who work for an internal incident response team do not get to see the big
picture; they might see only incidents from their company. However, those who work
for a MSSP have a vision of many breaches from all over the world, which allows
them to correlate breaches from one company to the other.
Organization A’s responsibilities and penalties in a Service Level Agreement
(SLA) are really dependent on what the customer is looking for and is willing to pay.
Typically for outsourced incident management services, there is a share agreement
between the provider and the customer; there are different levels of incidents or
indicators of compromise, different severity of attacks but at the end of the day, it is
very much about what the customer is willing to pay for.
Everybody theoretically wants 100% security, there is no such thing but everybody
wants a maximum security environment and not everybody needs it nor has the
money to pay for it, nor is willing to pay for it.
A problem in real life for the providers is that many customers want services to be
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implemented in mass and to be working without false positives, basically not being
alerted for stuff that is not relevant. That depends on the quality of the services, but
in the future, there will be more innovation into other IT systems, basically network
systems and security systems would become integrated.
5.1.3 Post Operation
Organization A considers that customers switch from one provider to another because
they are not having the service that their former providers said they provided or
because the service is too expensive or a combination of both. There might be also
cases where the provider was not able to help them, because they didn’t see the
attack coming and the customer’s assets got affected.
5.2 Case B
This section describes findings from Case B, where the interviewee has an account
service deliverable role. Organization B is an enterprise-class Managed Security
Service Provider.
5.2.1 Pre Operation
Organization B describes that the cost reduction is the main driver for most of the
companies that are looking for the possibility to outsource IT services. Depending on
the quality of the services that will be outsourced, it will have an impact on the cost.
Organization B highlights that the communication inside organizations and
companies should be considered. It is important to be aware that outsourcing
services to global companies might impact the internal communication. People are
used to communicate in their own language, but with the integration of outsourced
services to locations with a cheaper labor cost, they will need to react and get used
to talking to people in another language for example English.
Organization B considers that the staff morale has an important role if companies
are considering outsourcing something that was previously run in-house. The staff
needs to be involved, making them understand why the decision to outsource was
made and try to make it positive. Outsourcing services do not necessarily means
firing people. It could be that the people just needs to be re-skilled and reassigned
to a different position within the company.
When Organization B submits a bid for a new client, people working within sales
want to deliver a bid which is as good as possible, low cost and delivered as soon as
possible. This looks very attractive for the client because there is a very competitive
price and Organization B promises everything up and running within a short time
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frame, faster than anyone else. However, when the deal is signed and the technicians,
project managers and architects among others are going to start on their work they
realize that is a lot more complex and not realistic to deliver it in the promised time
frame. If Organization B is not able to perform the project with a new client within
the given deadline, then all additional project costs are absorbed by Organization B
until the project has been completed.
5.2.2 Operation
Organization B has implemented global procedures; it aims for fewer but larger
service desks to support its clients. But some of the global procedures have reduced
some short-cuts during the follow up process.
“It is not that easy to take the short-cuts that you were used to take
earlier because you don’t know the people who is actually working on the
service desk any more, that was a lot easier when we have met before
during meetings. I mean it was easier to get hold of them and maybe use
some short-cuts if you needed some quick help. That is not as easy any
more; we should follow the same procedure on the service desk anywhere
in the world and is working quite good actually.”
Organization B has offshore centres in India and Lithuania. The resources
situated in those locations have different type of rules. The service desk is located
in Lithuania, while the offshore center in India handles incident management and
problem management. Previously the service desk was located in Norway but based
on a cost driven evaluation, it was moved to provide a global service desk for the
Nordic region. The clients still call the same phone number, and can still talk to
people who speak their language.
The cultural differences between India, Lithuania or the Nordic countries could
be challenging for Organization B, because in India the resources are not as good to
take decisions on their own, they need to be told what to do and that means that
they are not working as independent as one would hope they would do.
“That is how they are used to work in India and I wouldn’t say that
it is a specific problem for Organization B, it is for all the companies
that have employees in India. They are kind of reluctant to make their
own decisions because if they make a bad decision, the impact could be
bigger for them than for us. It is easier for them to get complains from
the managers if they do something wrong compare to other countries.”
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Organization B spends some time to follow up the resources in India because of
the cultural differences.
“They don’t think that much out of the box, they just follow what they
have been told to do, while in the Nordic countries people try to think on
their own and resolve the problem. A major improvement not only for
Organization B but for all people working with offshore resources in India
would be that the Indian resources become better at taking independent
decisions and not just wait being told what to do. Sometimes you get tired
of telling people what to do, even if they are a lot more skilled than you,
because they are reluctant to make their own decisions.”
Organization B has locations in India at three or four different areas. Even though
there have been few occasions where due to different circumstances like earthquakes,
strikes, or riots people has not been able to get to work, Organization B has never
experienced a problem within all the regions at the same time.
“Having these functions spread over different locations is a good way
to spread the risk, if one location is somehow not able to get to work, we
have resources at other locations that could assist until they are up and
running again.”
Whenever Organization B’s customers have an incident, either reported by the
customer itself or detected by Organization B a ticket is raised and based on the
information available a resolver group is assigned according to the incident priority. If
it is high priority incident, a major incident management is gathered with the account
team. Once the issue is identified the client is informed about it and about the
troubleshooting performed. If the problem takes longer than expected, a time frame
for updates is agreed and updates are provided until the problem has been resolved.
Then the problem management team gets involved to find the reasons for the issue and
to identify how future occurrences could be prevented. Based on that information
improvements are designed or implemented. Everything gets documented. The
documentation contains all the details from the problem registration to completion,
updates during the troubleshooting, cause and preventive measures. There is a global
process within Organization B for incident management and problem management.
During the incident management, everything is documented to get as much details
as possible into the documentation that is shared with the client. Then during
a meeting with the client, all details are explained. The client might be happy
with the documentation provided, if not the client would come with feedback that
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would trigger a new follow up activity within Organization B to see whether there is
something that could be improved in order to resolve the problem.
Organization B performs a proactive work with its clients to prevent the problems
before they actually occur. Organization B has weekly technical meetings with the
clients to discuss the updates and security patches that would be applied. By having
this kind of meetings and also providing monthly reports the client perceives that
Organization B does whatever it can do to make sure that the client’s environment
is safe in order to avoid any kind of incidents on their systems.
The penalties at the SLAs might differ from account to account. The more
demanding SLAs the client want, the more they have to pay to Organization B,
because it requires more staff. Organization B has different SLAs according to
the environment (production, test, development, etc.). The SLAs related with the
production environment have higher cost and penalties than the rest. However,
Organization B has compensation agreements.
“If an SLA is missed and there is a penalty, the compensation could
be used. If the following three months there are no more SLA penalties
then the penalty that Organization B would have had to pay gets waived.”
When Organization B detects an incident, fast decisions must be made. First
of all, the client is contacted to provide it with information on the incident and to
explain what is recommended to do. Once the approach is approved or the client has
provided input from its end and an agreement is reached, that information is passed
within the internal Organization B’s team that is handling that specific incident to
resolve the problem.
“I am always trying to take the fastest way to get hold on the client. I
can basically call the client 24/7 if we have any problems and I can discuss
with her/him the approach that should be taken. Even though Organization
B needs to make the changes, the client needs to take decisions. By me
calling someone from the client directly I feel that I am really able to make
decisions very quick and be proactive so that we can try to resolve the
problem as soon as possible.”
5.2.3 Post Operation
Organization B describes that the client can always cancel the contract whenever
it wants but there are some cancellation clauses. If the contract is ended before it
expires then there is a fee that needs to be paid in order to get out of that contract.
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Organization B has had a client which decided to look for another service provider
once the contract expired. A transition project started to move the Organization B’s
infrastructure assigned to the client to the new vendor. The client had to pay for
everything that had to do with the transition. Most of the challenges were actually
for the client and the new vendor. Once the transition project started was when the
client and the new vendor actually realized how complicated things are. Organization
B needs to handle documentation to the new vendor about the systems that provide
support for the client.
The problem is similar when a new client is changing provider to Organization
B. It is difficult to transition all the servers, infrastructure and to get the problem
knowledge. It is more difficult for the service provider that is taking on with the
service and it is easier for the provider which is handing over an existing infrastructure.
“The client often forgets how complicated is to actually rent and
maintain an environment. And it seems like the client does not realize
about that until is moving everything to another vendor. Then the client
understands how complicated things are and how many things can go
wrong. But by that time it is too late, because they have already signed
an agreement with a new vendor.”
Organization B describes that sometimes it can be difficult to get the information
from the previous vendor because it might be reluctant to give that information
easily; it is knowledge that took many years to get. So they do not give anything to
Organization B automatically. However, Organization B behaves similarly.
“We give them all the information that we are obliged to but maybe
we do not tell them all the bits and pieces with the knowledge that we only
have in our own head and that it is not documented.”
In some cases it gets more complicated. Organization B had a client for 10 to 15
years that decided to change provider. The transition project has now been delayed
for about a year because the new vendor sees that this is a lot more complicated
than what it was assumed originally. As a result, Organization B has actually signed
a new agreement with the client for a number of the deliverables, not everything.
Then, the client was so unhappy with the new vendor that Organization B won back
part of the deliverables. The new vendor did not have all the knowledge and skills to
run and maintain everything the client wanted. That is not because Organization B
did not give to the new vendor the information. It was more complex, more difficult
to run and maintain than may be what it was assumed when the client and the new
vendor signed the agreement.
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5.3 Case C
This section describes findings from Case C, where the interviewee has a cyber
security technologist role. Organization C is an enterprise-class Managed Security
Service Provider.
5.3.1 Pre Operation
Organization C recommends that when any provider offers services they should be
clear about where these services are located in the incident management process,
where the starting point is, where the ending point is and what are the resources
required from the customer in order to implement the services.
“Every provider tries to differentiate their services compared to some-
body else. Some may decide to market whatever they do in a slightly
different way to try to gain a competitive advantage. I don’t know if we
will ever have a universal agreement on the nature of the services.”
Organization C describes that there is a lot of confusion about the services offered,
since some providers label things differently so that they can serve as a differentiator
for them. Customers are trying to figure out what exactly is the service provided,
whether the service is provided at their facilities or remotely and what are the changes
needed in order to implement the services provided.
Organization C highlights that it is important to understand the customer ex-
pectations, especially when the customer is switching from one provider to another,
as well the expectations that were not met by the previous provider. The provider
needs to understand the new customer’s challenges in order to identify the services
that can be offered in that category and propose something based on it, response
times, types of skill sets that can be provided, or a set of services based on their prior
experience.
5.3.2 Operation
Organization C has very specific SLAs for incident reporting or detection based on its
severity. If there is an incident or suspected incident there is an escalation process to
notify the costumer, which is done by phone or by other means based on its severity.
The customers can watch and look back over the history in order to understand what
happened and how they were notified during the incident detection phase. However,
Organization C uses a different set of SLAs when it comes to incident response.
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“I think it is somewhere unrealistic to have very specific response times,
particularly for a large customer. Response times can vary depending on
their geographic location and the nature of the skills needed.”
Regarding SLA’s responsibilities and penalties, Organization C describes that the
nature of both the costumer and the provider should be understood. It is important
to consider what is being offered and what the consequences are for the customer if
that service is not offered.
“Most vendors are not willing to take a lot of liability for something
that is unpredictable as responding an incident.”
Pre-paid services commonly involve an agreement between the provider and the
customer to provide a service on-demand guaranteed by a fee payment established
on the agreement. Pre-paid services, with clear obligations and penalties, certainly
helps to guarantee financial consequences for any failure to meet the SLAs. However,
it is probably unrealistic to expect any serious penalties beyond a few free hours or
something else that may be offered in compensation for the failure, eventually the
ultimate penalty is that the customer chooses to go elsewhere. It tends to get people
sufficiently motivated in some cases to not lose clients.
“When a customer chooses to go elsewhere it becomes your guide in
terms of whether or not you meet the expectations even if it is not written
in the contract.”
Organization C describes that even when companies outsource incident manage-
ment services, the companies still need to have legal and human resources inside the
organization that need to be involved when there is an incident. Legal advisors need
to decide when you are obligated to report, stakeholders need to define what they
communicate to the media and to their customers, as well as the process by which
they do that.
Organization C explains that planning and defining roles and responsibilities
is very important especially for those companies that aim to do a comprehensive
outsourcing. Defining physical and logical access credentials prior to an incident is
essential in order to prevent delays during the investigation and remediation process,
alerting and reporting responsibilities should be well defined so that the expectancies
would be unambiguous.
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Current customers might also choose to engage Organization C in services not
acquired before, when they are going through an incident. The engagement tends to be
due to the incident, not necessarily an ongoing service. In those cases Organization C
responds to the incident, and since there is already a contract in place, the engagement
gets priced in. However, Organization C gets approached also by new customers who
suspect of a security breach.
“The challenge there is to be able to respond quickly enough, get a
contract in place, get somebody on site and be able to access whatever
device is expected to be compromised, and investigate the breach.”
Having prepaid service might be easier from the contractual standpoint but there
is still the issue of making sure that the contract of those provided services have
people available to respond as needed, since the personnel might be actively engaged
in different tasks. Then it becomes a staffing issue of being able to provide the
appropriate people at the appropriate time. A lot of customers may choose to have
multiple vendors engaged in a contractual relationship, or something similar, to call
at the moment of need, expecting all of the providers to jump in the action.
Customers may have multiple providers but usually only one is engaged in at any
given time. The interaction between multiple providers might happen from time to
time in some of the bigger incidents, but there is some sort of hierarchy involved,
so that they can make sure that somebody is in charge. In some cases there are
different providers supporting the same incident, and even when they are all doing
different things, there can be some overlap.
Many customers are just simply interested in getting everything back, up and
running and removing whatever it affected them. In terms of how far an incident is
investigated, it is always dictated by the customer. It is the customer’s decision to
pursue it further or not. Some of the customers decide not to fully investigate because
there are reporting obligations that they have to follow if Personally Identifiable
Information (PII) is compromised.
Organization C explains that internal incident management teams might benefit
from different areas of specialization. In some cases the incident management team
might need specific services to improve their incident management plan and strategy,
documentation and more. In other cases, the internal team might lack expertise in
advance topics like malware analysis or reverse engineering. Finally, the internal
incident management teams might have an appropriate expertise, both technical and
managerial skills, but the incident might be too large or the team is also handling
something else and more manpower is needed. Then they could get some services
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from a provider in order to work side by side, sharing resources and adding specialized
support.
It is important that the provider integrates well with the customer. If the customer
relies completely on the provider, there will be some challenges with getting the
customer’s management up to speed and fully appreciating the nature of the incident.
The customer is the one that is bearing the risk, and if it doesn’t have qualified
people; it is a lot harder to make decisions. On the other hand it can be difficult to
integrate between two teams that are trying to respond in the same way. So having
clear lines of responsibility in terms of who does what is certainly preferable.
There are different approaches to real time response such as the Observe, Ori-
ent, Decide, Act (OODA) framework. Independently of the approach taken, it is
important to define clearly the roles and responsibilities of those observing, orienting,
deciding and acting, because those activities performed by different parties might
vary depending on who is having those roles.
“[OODA] is indeed a useful process but at each of those stages, it is
important to have a clear role on who is observing and what are they
observing, who is orienting and what are they orienting themselves against,
who is making the decision and what are the actions based on.”
Organization C explains that one of the current challenges for MSSPs is to
understand the customer’s environment better. That means doing some work prior to
an incident to first of all define the processes, the procedures by which the response
is done, what the network looks like, what applications are run, where the critical
assets are located, what does the organizational structure looks like in terms of who
can authorize what, and more.
The best relationship between providers and customers is where the roles and
responsibilities are clear, it is not necessarily better that the provider does everything,
even though it is financially convenient. The provider just needs to make sure that
the customer is not ignoring the risks and the decisions they need to make themselves.
The risks can’t be taken on behalf of the customer. It is their task to say, this asset
is important and the provider can for example give advice about what should be
done. However, it is the customer who has to face legal responsibilities if any loss of
data, lawsuits from customers or loss of intellectual property is experienced.
Organization C highlights that the industry is still lacking better automation and
better integration to address incidents. With better automation at the customer level,
the easier it is for them to do many tasks themselves and the easier it is for a provider
to come in and use those mechanisms. More integration of multiple incident response
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tools is needed to offer more complete software packages, as well as integration from
software vendor’s products and MSSP’s tools.
“Software vendors prefer to sell their products to end costumers than
to service providers because they can get more profit through those sales.
The software vendors are not always receptive to integrating with outside
vendors and the tools they use.”
Organization C outlines that threat data and threat intelligence needs to be better
integrated with the tools used for incident handling.
“We work hard in our organization to try to integrate threat intelligence
data right directly into our security information and event management
(SIEM) so that we can actually respond in real time to new potential
attacks that are coming in.”
Some IRTs are providing tools that integrate data that they have collected from
their incidents which can be used to be more proactive in responding to future
incidents. But there is still more to be done to integrate threat intelligence with
larger databases to be able to identify and stop threats before they have any impact.
5.4 Case D
This section describes findings from Case D, where the interviewee has a director
of incident response role. Organization D is an enterprise-class Managed Security
Service Provider.
5.4.1 Pre Operation
Organization D describes that the incident response community has done a relatively
poor job at defining terms and standardizing processes. This makes it difficult for those
looking at outsourced incident management services, if they are not incident response
experts, to fully understand what the services offered by MSSPs are. Organization D
devotes time helping potential clients to understand how what Organization D does
is different from what others do and what some of the differences in its proposal are.
Organization D outlines that Chief Information Security Officers (CISO) have
difficulties to adequately plan financially for incident management services when an
outsourcing provider would be contracted. It is hard for CISOs to have certainty in
how much they will spend every year since it might depend on the type of contract,
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the type of services, how many incidents the organization would have, their complexity
and how long it takes to resolve them. For example, the budget for external services
might be exceeded quickly during very large incidents.
5.4.2 Operation
Organization D considers that some organizations should find out how to effectively
integrate an external party providing incident management services. On one extreme
are those organizations that are overloaded at certain point of time and need help
on doing services that they don’t have time to do. On the other extreme are the
organizations that need the outsource partner to provide all the resources that
are necessary from both a technical and non-technical perspective to resolve the
incident. These are the two extremes and usually every organization outsourcing
incident management services falls somewhere between the two of them. According to
Organization D, the latter case is the most difficult case to integrate in an organization,
because people that are potentially not familiar with the organization, who don’t
know who all the players are, they have to learn about it on the fly. These difficulties
can delay the response to an incident.
Organization D manages the engagement with their customers considering the
nature and size of its client. Small businesses might be more dependent on the provider
to manage almost everything related to the incident, whereas larger businesses which
have their own security teams may supplement their existing staff with the provider’s
help. In both small and large businesses, there is a lot of fear in the employees today
when it comes to incidents, because people are fired every day due to handling them
improperly or not being able to contain them adequately.
“Customers with incident response roles fear to get fired when an
incident is out of control; there is when they feel that the outside provider
can help them manage something in the right way so that they don’t get
fired.”
Organization D devotes time with the customers to understand not only what
is happening during an incident but what it is exactly the customer’s need from
Organization D in order to help them to deal with the incident.
Organization D describes that it provides, in its contracts, descriptions of each
service, as well as service level agreements for those services. These SLA’s define how
soon actions for response would be provided, such as the time to get someone on the
site.
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Organization D considers that customers can significantly improve their prepared-
ness and their response time for incident response services if they start collecting the
correct data and instrument appropriately their network and systems. The biggest
problem that providers encounter technically when responding to an incident is the
fact that most organizations are not collecting sufficient logs and data to facilitate
the incident response process. If customers would collect the correct information
and store it for sufficient time, it would significantly speed the response and could
even allow some response functions to be performed remotely to avoid waiting for
someone to actually get on site and to start searching for what is happening on the
network or the infrastructure.
Organization D describes that customers can evaluate threat intelligence by
finding out how intelligence is collected by the company, asking a series of questions
such as what are their sources, what are the capabilities of the people that are
performing that function, and more. The other way to do it is to either purchase the
service for a short period of time or get samples and compare information between
providers to determine the best option according to what is actually needed.
Regarding remote response, Organization D comments that IT departments in
general don’t like agents because every additional agent creates the potential that
there is going to be problems that the IT department is going to have to deal with.
Generally the CISO or the decision maker has to convince the ultimate decision
maker, whether is the IT manager, the Chief Information Officer (CIO) or someone
else, that the value of having an agent running on an endpoint is greater than the
potential cost that IT is going to potentially have by adding an additional agent.
Organization D has worked with customers to help convincing their IT departments
or their CIO as to why the benefit of running the agent at the endpoint is greater
than the cost.
Organization D highlights that MSSPs have the same problems that companies
have in hiring and retaining good talent. There is such a shortage of people with
capabilities for incident response activities. It is difficult to hire as many people as
is needed. Organization D is addressing this issue by hiring more junior talent and
helping to train them. The new employees learn through training and in depth hands
on experience.
“If you look at the available training, many of them help with very
procedural types of functions but don’t really help to understand the bigger
picture and how the response to certain types of incident activity should
be. That is still learned by people through experience.”
Organization D describes that incident response roles involve multiple roles that
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are not clearly defined in the industry. The skills from those performing these roles
can be to a great extent so different, that describing a person as an incident response
expert, doesn’t give a clear indication to what capabilities that person actually has.
Organization D is going through a process of defining what those roles actually are
for its own needs, so that when hiring people, there would be a clear understanding
about what they really have experience in and how that maps to what it is we need
at any particular profile.
Organization D highlights that the NIST incident response model doesn’t make
sense any more because it handles an incident in a linear way. Organization D is a
strong proponent of the OODA loop and believes that it would change the efficiency
and effectiveness of processes.
“The OODA loop concept fits in well with the concept of incident
response.”
5.4.3 Post Operation
Organization D describes that when a customer switches providers, then it is more
challenging for the provider getting the new contract, especially when there is an
incident in progress. The new provider has to catch up with the state of that
particular incident. On the other hand, the provider losing a contract may not have
much incentive to participate on the process and would probably do it only to the
extent of what has been agreed.
5.5 Case E
This section describes findings from Case E, where the interviewee has a director of
cyber security services role. Organization E is an enterprise-class Managed Security
Service Provider.
5.5.1 Pre Operation
Organization E describes that customers have a very difficult time predicting how
much resources or help they are going to need and justifying it within their business.
There are moments where cyber-attacks reported in newspapers as headlines or in
the news get everybody’s attention which might make justifications easier, but when
those fade, people’s memory goes back to being difficult to justify doing these services
and spending that money until something bad happens again.
Organization E considers that security is not very mature in the customer’s mind
in terms of something that is mandatory. It is not something that organizations do
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as a luxury, organizations have to be vigilant and be as secure as possible all the
time and there is where many of the customers are either na¨ıve or they still struggle
to build a security awareness mindset.
Organization E provides services to a very wide spectrum of customers which
have different levels of security maturity. Some customers don’t understand that
information should be preserved and logged to be able do an investigation. Some
others think that they just need to acquire some service when they need it and
there will be all kind of vendors sitting there just waiting to be called, offering
ample resources with no difficulties to provide help when needed. There are other
more mature customers that acquire specific services to complement what they have
within their organization and are on their way to build up internally the outsourced
capability to be more self-sufficient.
Organization E highlights that customers are having a very difficult time attracting,
finding and retaining skilled resources that can meet their growing demands and so
are the providers. Finding dedicated people that do this work because this is what
they love to do and they don’t want to do other things, is hard. It is important to
create bonds with universities and research groups. Moreover, this is a career path
with high pressure and high burn-out. Skilled resources are on the road a lot, it is
hard to have a life in this area and it is very stressful, because both the customers
and the providers alike are looking over their shoulder constantly, both want answers
and want them really fast. Furthermore, the skilled resources usually deal with
unsophisticated customers, trying to translate things into an understandable dialogue
that the customers can follow. There are a lot of frustrations and pressures in these
roles. It is a very rewarding job to people that is not very stressful and can’t get
burned out.
“Security professionals are like doctors or surgeons who tell their clients
precisely what they need to do to stay healthy and to cure themselves, but
the clients ignore the advice and keep doing what they are doing. It is
frustrating.”
5.5.2 Operation
Regarding Service Level Agreements, Organization E considers that there is no way
to promise some customer that the provider’s resources will be on site within a very
specific amount of time. Everything is done of best effort and there are no artificial
time limits. There is no way that a provider can promise to get to the bottom of
something in an investigation in a certain period of time because each situation is
different. It is hard to state service level agreements because there is no level of
predictability in these kinds of situations.
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“Sometimes the customer has the data available, sometimes they don’t,
and sometimes they have people that are available to work with the provider,
but sometimes they don’t.”
Organization E provides services often times to customers that can’t afford to
build up their own capability internally, because they think that security incidents
happens rarely within their business and they don’t need to have a dedicated group
within their business to do this kind of work. However, when Organization E provides
services to customers with an internal incident management team, the team is
typically mature and self-sufficient. These customers are not looking to hire someone
from the outside that command and assist them unless it is too complex; they are
just too busy on other things going on within their business and need some support.
Organization E considers that when multiple providers are contracted to handle
an incident, the customer is the one that dictates how the investigation should be
done and defines the separation of duties to be handled by the companies that are
brought in.
Organization E describes that the biggest difficulty in being able to perform
incident response in real time is not being able to work remotely all the time. This is
complicated, it might take a lot of bandwidth and a lot of customers don’t like the
idea of their data leaving the organization. If providers would be able to put agents
on the customer’s devices it would speed things up and make it much easier to get to
the root cause of an incident. It will certainly speed up the information and would
help to identify where did everything start.
Organization E considers that few customers are buying or consuming intelligence.
Even though it is helpful to know if their organization is being targeted by any
group, why they are targeting them, what kind of attack they would use in order to
attack them and what are they after within their organization. Acquiring intelligence
services will help the customers to look for the right kind of anomalies, the behaviour,
the indicators of compromise, hopefully to be able to stop any attack from those
groups.
Organization E believes that the biggest problem that the information security
industry has is a too limited skill set. More efforts on producing the skills in a more
adequate manner are required, so that they are not in such limited supply. Customers
struggle, providers struggle and it is hard to do this work consistently because both
customers and providers are fighting over a small number of resources that exist
capable of doing this type of work. The need for these resources will keep growing,
the more there is sophisticated technology such as cloud services, social networks
and the internet of things, the more skilled and trained people will be required.
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5.5.3 Post Operation
Organization E considers that there are no difficulties during the transition from one
provider to another and describes that businesses that do this kind of work are quite
professional and sophisticated so any provider is able to come in and follow up where
the competitor left.
“I think the businesses that do this kind of work are pretty good and
we are able to follow somebody else without much difficulty and I am sure
that they are able to follow us if we don’t keep doing the business. They
are probably able to follow up on our work and do so pretty seamlessly.”
5.6 Case F
This section describes findings from Case F, where the interviewee has a security
senior director role. Organization F is an enterprise-class Managed Security Service
Provider.
5.6.1 Pre Operation
Organization F emphasizes that there are too many vendors in the market. From a
customer perspective, it is very difficult to determine which of the managed security
service providers, in the market around the world, are the right choice for the needs
of the customers. All of them describe their services essentially in the same manner,
but their products are in fact vastly differentiated. From a provider perspective, it
is very difficult to convince the companies about how the provider’s service solves
the problem in a particular way and why the company should buy it from a specific
provider. There are many other providers claiming to provide the same service and
probably at a lower price but may not be doing it to a level of completeness. MSSPs
should find the way to communicate their pro-activity, the skills and knowledge from
their personnel and the methodology which their processes are aligned to.
Organization F describes that companies are concerned about passing a part of
the business to a third party and the costs that this involves. Companies have to
convince their decision makers that outsourcing the security services will provide an
equivalence or improvement of capability. However, some companies are reluctant
to buy services since outsourcing doesn’t necessarily reduce security costs to the
company but it tends to add new costs.
Organization F believes that customers should rethink the way they are looking
for services in the market. They are looking at the technical specifications in many
services not at the real challenges that they are trying to address. On the other hand,
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MSSPs should better educate their customers on what they really do as a service
provider and what they actually achieve inside their customers. MSSPs take the
repeatable security tasks from the customers and bundles them to a standardized
process. Then all those tasks get done all the time on schedule and in a predictable
way.
Organization F outlines that security professionals, in small or medium size
businesses, are responsible for a very large set of capabilities and as a result master
few technology or are responsible for the implementation of all the technology. This
leads to people setting the technology once and never revisiting it. People don’t
have the time, the energy or the capability to go back and keep constantly adjusting
it to realign the technology to the constant changes in their environment and new
threats in the cyber-world. The security personnel in those companies are in reality
scattered over multiple technologies and don’t have time to do things as a process.
Whereas, the MSSP’s personnel is constantly adjusting and changing what is needed.
They face continuously some of the same problems with different customers and the
knowledge acquired through similar cases is used to develop response processes.
Organization F highlights that companies are also concerned about losing job
positions due to outsourcing. It is a real concern that produces animosity inside
companies. The MSSPs need to persuade their customers that what they are doing
is to take away the repeatable processes, so that the customer security personnel
can do the interesting and new tasks. Instead of losing their jobs, the customer’s
personnel are benefited by improving their tasks. When their company outsourced
security services, they get the opportunity to focus on the activities that actually
demands high human skills opposed to the repeatable tasks.
Organization F emphasizes that MSSPs have staffing problems. They need to
get sufficient people, skilled in sufficient technology to manage the customer needs.
However, there is a shortage of skilled workers.
Organization F describes that many of the issues with managed security providers
originate from the customer because the customers don’t have good security control
processes. The customers may have no control of their systems. They treat security
as the last component of getting something done and because it is being outsourced,
it is easier to blame the security provider instead of looking at the fact that they
have inappropriate control of their own processes.
Organization F emphasizes that customers have to stop thinking that their security
environment and security challenges are unique. They don’t need to have something
that is special to them.
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“After many years of doing this, I have come across not a single
customer that is in fact unique. Even though every single customer
believes that is unique. However, you still have to say yes you are unique;
we will place this just for you. In reality we don’t, everyone in the industry
knows this and unfortunately is beginning to play.”
5.6.2 Operation
Organization F describes that in every single contract customers want changes from
the standard process. Everyone wants something that is unique. The battle during the
contract time is commonly on the control of the process, on the ongoing maintenance
of the environment and on the support of the things agreed to support in the way
that the customer wanted to be. Furthermore, something that also creates issues is
the fact that customers don’t know their environment.
MSSPs prefer to have control of the process because that allows them to keep the
ability to keep a particular price for a commodity. The customer on the other hand,
especially a new customer, doesn’t want to give up the control that it has. Regarding
the maintenance of the environment, it requires changes constantly and often times
very rapidly. The problem is that in order to run the maintenance process correctly
it has to match with how the customer runs their maintenance process on the rest
of their environment. However, the rest of their environment is usually not aligned
with good security practices. MSSPs need to negotiate with the customers about
this topic especially at contract time.
Support to the customers can reach a huge level of complexity that is commonly
not expressed at any point of time during the sales process because the customer
omits details, or maybe is not aware of the complexity. In some cases, customers
want specific versions of security technologies that may not be currently supported or
they want their devices to be managed under a specific set of circumstances which are
not industry standard but strange and unusual. Often times customers don’t know
what their environment is and the providers end up with all sorts of surprises during
the contracting process. Customers may not understand what they are turning over
to the provider so that the provider can actually take control of it.
Regarding roles and responsibilities, Organization F describes that MSSPs usually
deal with two types of organizations: organizations with clear roles and respon-
sibilities and organizations without clear designations. The ones with clear roles
and responsibilities are usually those that are heavily regulated like the ones in the
health care, financial or insurance industries. The ones without clear designations
usually have shared responsibilities for specific roles and in some cases they even
allow everyone the responsibility and the rights to make changes.
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Organization F considers that penalties on a managed security service provider
are an overload of requests to do things beyond how the provider sells the service.
Customers will typically receive a certain amount of services provided on the contract
for a given month. The provider will do some tasks constantly, and would be able to
make a certain number of changes per month. Once the provider exceeds the number
agreed in a given time period, the customer will start penalizing the provider because
that is additional work that is not budgeted for the customer. The cost of this work
will be charged back to the provider.
Organization F highlights that from the technical point of view, the reality of
what leads to the current security confusion is that the development process is done in
a customized manner. If everything would be done after a standard set of capabilities,
the MSSPs could secure things much easier. The baseline would have a standard
process and a standard way of addressing it. A good example for this is virtualization,
in a virtualized environment all is in one place. MSSPs can apply security controls
in a standardized manner.
Organization F describes that internal incident response teams benefit from
additional workers in the process of incident response. For those customers that don’t
have an internal incident response team and have acquired the on-demand incident
response capability, the providers end up running the incident response process for
them or supporting them through the learning process as well as when they tumble
around and figure out how to do it themselves.
Organization F believes that the MSS industry needs to focus on managing the
capability not managing devices. The industry has only a small set of services to
grow right now. It is important to find the way to make customers understand that
what they need is not a set of services but a managed capability of security in their
organization.
5.6.3 Post Operation
Organization F believes that customers are switching providers because they consider
that they are paying too much for the service level that they get. As a consequence,
they look for another MSSP that can offer them a better focus on them with more
technical capabilities for a cheaper price. Another reason, but not so common, is
when providers have made a mistake at some colossal scale and the trust with their
customers is lost. Then, the customers leave the provider. However, in some cases
providers get blamed for things that they can do nothing about.
Organization F highlights that in some cases customers are leaving the providers
because they want to get back the services outsourced when they have matured. In
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these cases, customers believe that they could do those services themselves much
cheaper and much better.
Organization F describes that when a customer leaves a provider, the provider
tries to transfer the customer’s capabilities in a clean manner without any misses.
This is always a challenge, especially considering that the provider is losing a costumer.
The provider wants to give a good service, so that it can get the customer back at
some point in the future. On the other hand, it is a loss and it is no longer the
provider’s responsibility. The provider might not want to put all the efforts into it if
the new provider is not picking up doing everything as it should.
Organization F describes that customers are not very good at orchestrating the
transition from one provider to another. The customer might want to control the
process and make sure that the entire basis is covered. The customer might affect
the transition if there are too many expectations. Furthermore, the customer doesn’t
hold the other vendor accountable for doing things as they should.
5.7 Case G
This section describes findings from Case G, where the interviewee is the manager of
the threat intelligence and incident response team. Organization G is an emerging
Managed Security Service Provider.
5.7.1 Pre Operation
Organization G describes that customers have difficulties to find out what they need.
There is a gap between the technical people responsible for delivering security and the
management board. The management board knows that there is a need to increase,
in some way, the information security. Therefore the company looks for someone
who can provide that service. As a consequence, there is often no link between the
company needs and what the person responsible for acquiring the services is looking
to protect. This person might not necessarily know what the business processes are
and what is important for the company to protect. When providers try to find out
what the company is trying to protect, it is often uncertain. There might be an idea
of the systems and IT services that they would like to protect but in general there is
no overview of the risk landscape that the company is facing.
Organization G helps its customers to look beyond finding services and discusses
with the management board the actual needs. In some cases, a lightweight risk
analysis is performed by risk and compliance consultants. Then, the results are
transferred to the system environment level and presented to the management board
as a tailored service that focuses on protecting the critical systems for the company.
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With this approach Organization G closes the gap during pre-sales but also after a
sale. It is an ongoing process to adapt the service to the company’s needs to protect
the critical assets in order to preserve the business.
5.7.2 Operation
Organization G highlights that there are different maturity security levels in companies
and a varied level of ability to receive the service. It is not possible to deliver the same
service at the same level to all different customers. The services require adapting
and tailoring them to each one of the customers. Some of the customers are more
mature and are able to consume the service in a more efficient and better way. They
are able to get more value from the services provided. Organization G has also some
customers that are not that mature. In these cases, it tries to help by educating them
to become more mature and to receive the services provided by the organization
more efficiently.
Organization G typically helps its customers with a low level of security maturity
to build the ability to handle security incidents. It helps the customers by establishing
a SOC or a CERT within the customer facilities. If the customers have the capability,
the means and are willing to do it, Organization G helps them to establish an incident
response framework, build tool sets and response exercises, build the entire incident
response team and in some cases even the risk department. When the customers don’t
have enough resources or man-power, Organization G offers them consultants which
could work as part of the customer team responsible for handling security incidents.
The consultants will help the customers handling the incidents even without having
a full incident response team and transferring knowledge to the employees of the
customer’s company. In a general approach customers get also workshops, training
and help to build routines and procedures.
Organization G describes that when customers have an established incident
response team, they hire certain services that are not efficient for them to have
in-house, such as monitoring and analysis. In some cases, customers hire specific
services or capabilities because are expensive to maintain such as forensic analysis or
malware analysis. It is expensive to have these services in-house because companies
can’t really hire only one guy to do those things, they need a team working together,
and that is hard to maintain in a smaller team.
One of the drawbacks of outsourcing is that customers don’t necessarily build
in-house the outsourced capabilities. They rely upon external parties to deliver all
services and customers need to trust that the quality of what is being delivered is
solid. Customers are dependent on the providers: if the provider is too busy to help
a customer with a non-contracted service, the customer won’t necessarily get the
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needed help. The customers must pay for a premium service to have people standing
by to react to emergency situations.
Organization G has multiple roles to ensure the quality of the different customer
services that are delivered. There is usually a role in the customer organization which
is the point of contact between Organization G and the customer. Organization G
has a technical account manager responsible for the communication, a sales account
manager responsible for the non-technical follow up on the customer and a range of
roles that are common across multiple customers.
Organization G has a model for refunding monthly costs if penalties are incurred.
Organization G’s penalties are depending on the type of SLA broken, which have a
percentage that is subtracted from the next month fee.
Organization G highlights that it has found a successful strategy to deal with
the shortage of skilled personnel. Organization G uses external companies to receive
candidates for interviews. However, in the latest years it has had success with hiring
part time students that are doing a bachelor or master degrees in information security
or in information technology. Organization G offers students a part time job and once
the students graduate, it offers a job to those that are skilled and want to continue
with their activities inside the organization.
“It has been a very successful strategy in terms of acquiring people. It
is easier now after this initiative with students.”
Organization G describes that when multiple providers are involved in an incident
each provider is typically hired to do specific tasks of the investigation. In some cases
the eradication and recovery steps require to tune something that is not managed by
the customer but by another provider. In these cases Organization G informs the
customer and sends the specifications for modifications to the service provider in
charge of that service. This approach might take some more time but it is working
and helping more companies.
Organization G highlights that as long as security components involve humans, it
can’t do anything in real time. In order to work around this issue, customers need to
give the service provider the ability to handle any incident 24/7 or customers need
to build certain functions that runs 24/7 within their own company to be able to
follow up on incidents 24/7. Customers are not reluctant to delegate management to
MSSPs in terms of network access, network traffic, logs and system logs. However,
some customers are reluctant to delegate management of end points to MSSPs.
Organization G comments that decision makers need to be well informed about the
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risks both in giving access to their MSSP and not doing it, because there are risks
related to not handling incidents in a proper way.
Organization G describes that it sells dedicated intelligence services to a minority
of its customers, only to those that are the most mature. Decision makers in the
companies don’t necessarily have abilities to define their own information needs.
They don’t know what threats are they facing, what decision they need to take and
don’t know what kind of information they need in order to make the right choices.
They need help defining what information is needed. Only after the customer realizes
what information is needed, can threat intelligence be provided.
Organization G emphasizes that some providers might offer threat intelligence
services but in reality is just data feed. Data is not necessarily threat intelligence.
Data must be evaluated and analysed to obtain consumable intelligence. Organization
G gathers the data that will be used to obtain intelligence from multiple data sources
such as partners, companies, individuals and through technical initiatives like multiple
sensor networks.
Organization G considers that there are many MSSPs but little interaction among
them. Something that would help the industry would be some kind of collaboration
and information sharing in order to become better together.
5.7.3 Post Operation
Organization G describes that the few cases where it has lost customers it is because
they wanted to have a global partner with global presence. Organization G has
participated with best effort during the transition projects. In some cases, the new
provider has not been able to handle something due to having no experience with
certain equipment. Organization G has strict policies to not provide rule sets when
passing equipment such as appliances. It will wipe the equipment and give the new
provider a clean appliance. However, Organization G will have a full transition
process when it is about operation centric services such as firewall operation, proxy
operation and network operation services. It will send the new people, that have
been hired to perform the same services, to India in order to educate and train them.
5.8 Expert 1
This section describes findings from Expert 1, where the interviewee is an independent
security consultant with more than 15 years of industry experience managing and
securing networks in both public and private sector. Expert 1 trains professionals on
management of incident response teams.
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5.8.1 Pre Operation
Expert 1 considers that the companies often times look for outsourcing as a lower cost
alternative to maintaining on-site staff. Outsourcing provides the opportunity for
lower cost services because it doesn’t use dedicated staff. Service providers are able
to offer companies a substantially reduced cost over having full time personnel on site
all the time. The providers have people on staff that is looking at multiple different
companies simultaneously. The positive side of this is that providers are in a position
where they are able to see the occurrences across many different organizations, and
take the expertise from each of those cases to convey that in terms of their capability
in multiple customers. The negative side is that companies don’t get the custom
capability that internal staff functionality would have. It is very difficult for an
outsource company to actually provide that level of capability and service.
Expert 1 describes that some companies don’t really need a customized function-
ality. Some small and medium size businesses have very similar needs and providers
know how to cover them effectively. The small companies look for a provider that can
balance the cost functionality and is suitably for the functions that their businesses
need. They usually just need somebody to pick up the telephone and call who
is good enough to deal with the sort of problems that they have. However, some
companies are ”unique” and can’t actually be compared to many other companies.
These companies can’t take advantage of all the outsourced capabilities needed to
effectively run incident management for their company. They have tailor needs that
require having internal dedicated staff with knowledge of the internal functionality
of the business, nuances and specific requirements that their business has.
Expert 1 considers that small companies need to deal with knowing their own
business, have a good established capability and report with the service provider
and try to develop exercises for them to anticipate what could happen. They have
to trust that the provider is acting in their best interest. On the other hand, large
companies need to realize that the service provider is going to be essentially a partner
providing expertise and then they need to find an organization that is committed
to this capability for the long term. All companies need to be self-aware enough to
understand how to transition all of the necessary information to the service provider.
Expert 1 recommends that when in doubt whether to outsource or not, companies
should ask themselves if someone else can do the services better, faster and cheaper
than them. If so outsource it. However, if it is something that involves data that the
company should keep private and probably wouldn’t want to allow out to any third
party, then do not outsource that activity and improve it internally.
Expert 1 recommends building a contract protecting against problems associated
with leaving that contract itself. An effective mechanism for identifying opportunities
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to exit from a contract, if the contract is insufficient, is the concept of service level
agreements. Both provider and customer agree to provide with functionality and to
provide with money respectively, as long as the targets of performance are being met.
When these targets are not met, then there is a vehicle by which the provider can
attempt to amend the missed targets. If the targets continue to be missed then there
is some other financial compensation and ultimately there is the opportunity for an
early release from a contract because of missed targets.
5.8.2 Operation
Expert 1 highlights that companies with a partial outsourcing model might have
internal expertise but don’t have the time to actually develop some specific knowledge
in-house or require a second opinion. Therefore, they look for a provider able to
accomplish effectively whatever is necessary for that particular company.
Expert 1 describes that nowadays it is absolutely possible to have a fully outsourced
model. It is possible to buy services for every single component that companies
would need to have to run their incident management smoothly. Some companies just
outsource all security services because that is not their core business; it is not how they
make money. Then, instead of having staff trying to do security activities, they just
look for experts on each one of those activities. Working with different partnerships
essentially requires very clear contractual boundaries with each and every different
partner involved. Therefore, companies should seek to minimize duplication of the
same effort, clearly articulate what expect to receive for any particular component
and what expect to return for any request. The difficulty, for any single company, is
to manage the insertion points across different providers offering specialized services
across different specialized topics. The alternative is to find some provider offering
all these services but companies have to keep expertise within their organization in
order to manage the interaction with the provider. Furthermore, the companies end
up transferring a lot of control to the provider. The intellectual property concern is
there across all companies, from small to large size companies.
Expert 1 typically recommends keeping expertise in-house. The in-house personnel
are able to identify weak points of certain capability. They can encapsulate the
components of those capabilities and identify boundaries where they could outsource
the functionality of those components. Companies should use any outsource capability
to make themselves substantially better. They should actively watch the outsourced
functionalities and measure their effectiveness. Otherwise, they will be dumping
money into something that will never really make the company better.
Expert 1 describes that the best model that he has seen is used by a company
which is essentially entirely outsourced. The incident management functionality and
all the technical functions were entirely outsourced. This is a large company based
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on the United States with a global market share and an unquestioned market leader
in what it does. This company has staffed people on the security department to
manage the relationships with their various outsource partners. Whenever there has
been an incident, the internal security staff knew who to address in the outsource
company and all the capabilities that that company provides to them. The security
staff manages all of the functionality but the functionality is all external.
Expert 1 recommends outsourcing services only when they will make the companies
much more effective. Companies need to know what they need to accomplish internally
and then obtaining the functionality externally. They should find the components
that are absolutely most successful and find out what things within that successful
component could be potentially outsourced. There might be things that were never
done, or have been always done in the same manner, something might come up. This
analysis on the successful components could develop an outsourcing capability. On
the other hand, very small pieces within the components performing poorly should be
outsourced. When something is performing poorly it is usually because the company
doesn’t understand what it should be doing. The company should think how it
could more effectively perform this functionality and outsourcing is just one of the
many opportunities to achieve improvement. Outsourcing that component often
times doesn’t teach the company what it should be doing. Furthermore, providers
don’t necessarily have the desire to improve the customer knowledge and they are
comfortable with the fact that companies buying their services stay essentially
ignorant to all the security functionalities that are necessary to do.
Expert 1 believes that a service provider should give an objective third party
perspective identifying strengths and weaknesses to their customers. Providers should
have a true intention of enhancing businesses and making those businesses more
effective; even if that means that the providers train their customers to take some
outsourced services back in house. From a partnership perspective, it ends up being
a very powerful mechanism for improving everything for your customer. From a
customer retention perspective, when the customers perceive that they are being
helped to become better, they will not look for anybody else.
Expert 1 highlights that the incident response model of many companies is to wait
for somebody to tell them that have been breached and then clean up. The latest
data breach reports show that a high number of data breaches were not discovered
by the company that was breached but were discovered by somebody else.
Expert 1 considers that real time response is an unapproachable accomplishment;
it will generate too much noise. Instead of trying to detect everything in real time,
companies should try to detect the things that really matter. Service providers
and companies should focus on detecting systems once they have been compromised
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within certain amount of time but aiming to not let the attackers get to their ultimate
objective.
5.8.3 Post Operation
Expert 1 describes that companies need to make sure that they can always get their
data back. Data and data in its many forms in terms of ownership and retention as
well as the potential long term retrieval collection should be carefully defined in the
contract.
Chapter6Discussion
In this chapter the findings from chapter 5 are discussed. Links are established
between the findings and the research questions presented in section 1.1
6.1 How do outsourced incident management services
benefit or affect current incident management teams?
Organization A describes that good communication with internal incident manage-
ment teams depends on the customer’s forensic readiness, meaning that the customer
is prepared and the stakeholders are involved in the case. If there is not a proper work-
ing model in the internal incident management team, there might be communication
conflicts due to a lack of internal communication.
A customer that has security controls in place, trains its people, has implemented
security awareness and knows what might be the threats gets more benefit on the
outsourced incident management services. Organizations E and G describe that
when internal incident management teams are mature and self-sufficient, they look
for assistance in services that are too complex or that are not efficient for them to
have in-house. Organizations A and C explain that outsourced incident management
services could benefit an internal incident management team by providing it with
more man-power, specialized services, managerial skills, a global perspective on
threats and multiple sources of intelligence. However, in some cases it might affect
internal teams that are trying to respond in the same manner if there are not clear
lines of responsibility in terms of which team does what type of tasks. Besides some
internal incident management teams might get affected by a reduction of staff.
Organization B comments that current incident management teams benefit from
participating in discussions and inputs coming from the provider getting a different
perspective in order to make decisions and reach agreements to deal with an incident.
Organization D highlights that some internal incident management teams might
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perceive the MSSPs as the help needed to prevent being fired when an incident is
out of control. Therefore it is important to spend time with the internal incident
management teams to understand better what is exactly needed from the provider
to help them to be prepared for future incidents.
Organization F describes that internal incident response teams benefit from
additional workers in the process of incident response. The internal incident team
passes the repeatable processes to the provider and the team can focus now on tasks
that demand human skills.
Organization F highlights that one of the drawbacks is that customers are depen-
dent on the providers and won’t build in-house the outsourced capabilities.
Expert 1 describes that internal incident management teams might be affected
by outsourced services when the teams don’t understand clearly what they should
be doing. Outsourcing services won’t teach them what to do and providers don’t
necessarily have the desire to improve their customer’s knowledge. Some providers
might be comfortable with the fact that their customers stay essentially ignorant
to all the security functionalities that are necessary. However, internal incident
management teams might benefit from outsourced capabilities that will provide
them with better task performance on services that were already successful before
contracting any service to the MSSP. As a result, successful security components are
strengthened with outsourced services.
6.2 How are roles, responsibilities and penalties described
in service level agreements between a customer and the
outsourced incident management service’s provider?
Organizations A and D describe that they offer different types of SLAs in terms of
different services. Organization A’s responsibilities and penalties are dependent on
what the customer is looking for and is willing to pay. The penalties differentiate
on what services are outsourced, traditional managed security services or managed
incident handling services, the level of the incident missed and the severity of the
attack.
Organization B explains that the roles and responsibilities are dependent on what
the client wants, the higher the SLAs the more they have to pay because it requires
more staff. Organization B offers different types of SLA’s not only in terms of different
services but also according to the environment (production, test, development, etc.).
The SLAs related with the production environment have higher cost and penalties
than the rest of the environments. The penalties at the SLAs might differ from
account to account. However, Organization B has compensation agreements, meaning
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that if an SLA is missed and there is a penalty, the compensation agreement could
be used in order to condone the penalty as long as the compensation agreement is
achieved.
Organization C has very specific SLAs for incident reporting or detection. If
there is an incident or suspected incident, there is an escalation process to notify
the customer, which is done by phone or by other means, based on its severity. But
Organization C uses a different set of SLAs when it comes to incident response.
Responsibilities and penalties are dependent on what is being offered and what the
consequences are for the customer.
Organization E considers that there is no way to promise some customer that the
provider’s resources will be on site within a very specific amount of time. Everything
is done of best effort and there are no artificial time limits. There is no way that
a provider can promise to get to the bottom of something in an investigation in a
certain period of time because each situation is different. It is hard to state SLAs
because there is no level of predictability in these kinds of situations.
Organization F handles the penalties as an overload of requests to do things
beyond how was agreed on the SLA. Once the provider exceeds the number of changes
agreed in a given time period, the customer will start penalizing the organization
because that is additional work that is not budgeted for the customer. The cost of
this work will be charged back to Organization F.
Organization G has multiple roles to ensure the quality of the different customer
services that are delivered. There is usually a role in the customer organization
which is the point of contact between Organization G and the customer. There
is a technical account manager responsible for the communication, a sales account
manager responsible for the non-technical follow up on the customer and a range
of roles that are common across multiple customers. Organization G’s penalties are
depending on the type of SLA broken, which have a percentage that is subtracted
from the next month fee.
6.3 Which challenges are experienced during the
implementation of these services in incident
management?
6.3.1 Pre Operation
Customer’s challenges
– Identifying the services needed. Many of the services are named differently
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by different providers which makes it more difficult for non-security aware
customers to find out the right services. Organization A recommends to make
an in depth search of the services and then get an independent view from a
third party, helping to understand what their strengths and weaknesses are
and what might be suitable for the company. Organization C recommends
that providers should be clear about where these services are located in the
incident management process, where the starting point is, where the ending
point is and what are the resources required from the customer in order to
implement the services. Organization D, F and G recommend providers to
devote time helping potential clients to understand how what they are doing is
different from what others do and what some of the differences in their proposal
are. Organization F advises the customers to not choose services through
technical specifications but according to the real challenges that are trying to
address. Expert 1 recommends outsourcing services only when they will make
the companies much more effective instead of outsourcing services that are
performing poorly. Companies need to know what they need to accomplish
internally and then obtaining the functionality externally. They should find
the components that are absolutely most successful and find out what things
within that successful component could be potentially outsourced.
– Choosing the right provider. Companies are not aware of the broad diver-
sity of providers that can offer them incident management services. Organization
A advises the companies to have a subscription or a working relationship with
an analyst company or a neutral third party in order to get an independent
view of the providers, helping to understand the MSSP market segmentation,
provider’s capabilities, flexibility and customer satisfaction. Organization F
recommends to find about the provider’s pro-activity, the skills and knowledge
from their personnel and the methodology which their processes are aligned to.
– Taking into consideration the staff morale. The staff morale might be
affected by the decision of outsourcing services that were previously run in-
house. In some cases the in-house personnel might be concerned about losing
their job positions. Organization B recommends involving the staff, and making
them understand why the decision was made and try to make it positive.
Organization F advises MSSPs to persuade their customers that what they are
doing is to take away the repeatable processes, so that the customer security
personnel can do the interesting and new tasks. Instead of losing job positions,
the in-house personnel would be benefited by improving its tasks.
– Adapting to a foreign language communication when using global
outsourced services. Outsourcing services to global companies might impact
the internal communication, since the staff might not be used to talking to
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people in another language such as English. Organization B recommends taking
the internal communication into account when choosing a service provider.
– Predicting resources and justifying them inside the business. Cus-
tomers may have a very difficult time predicting how much resources or help
they are going to need and justifying it within their business. Organization E
advises to take advantage of cyber-attacks reported in newspapers as headlines
or in the news to make justifications easier.
Provider’s challenges
– Having control over the outsourced service. MSSPs prefer to have
control of the process because that allows them the ability to keep a particular
price for a commodity. The customers on the other hand, are reluctant to
provide the control. Organization F recommends MSSPs to negotiate this with
the customers especially at contract time because constant changes are required
in a rapid manner and should be aligned to good security practices.
6.3.2 Operation
Customer’s challenges
– Communication between external and internal incident management
teams. Internal communication within an incident where clear roles and
communication mechanisms have not been established in the internal incident
management team can cause communication conflicts. Organization A describes
that it is important that the customers have developed some forensic readiness
and incident management planning describing IRT roles and responsibilities.
– Multiple providers interaction during an incident. Customers may have
multiple providers supporting the same incident which, even if they are assigned
to do different tasks, can have some overlap. Organization C recommends
that there should be some hierarchy involved when multiple providers are
engaged in the same incident, to make sure that somebody is in charge and
perhaps solve overlapping tasks. Organization E describes that the customer
should be the one dictating how the investigation would be done and defining
the separation of duties to be handled by the companies that are brought in.
Organization G recommends to inform the customer about overlaps and to be
proactive and address the rest of the providers in charge of a specific security
component overlapping, providing them with specifications for modifications.
Expert 1 describes that working with different providers requires very clear
contractual boundaries with each and every different partner involved. The
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customers should seek to minimize duplication of effort, clearly articulating
what is expected from each provider.
– Collecting logs from systems and infrastructure. Customers might not
be logging what is happening in their infrastructure. The use of logs is something
that does not necessarily require many resources, but it provides great help
investigating an incident. Organization D advises to collect sufficient logs and
data in order to facilitate and improve the customer’s incident response process.
This will allow verifying the information of an incident and would significantly
speed the provider’s response enabling some response functions to be performed
remotely.
Provider’s challenges
– Providing emergency response services to new customers. Emergency
response services are those that companies can call on during 24 hours every
day of the year when they have an emergency. Organization A advises that
experienced security professionals which have developed their skills through
different cases are the most suitable to provide help quickly in an unknown
infrastructure, being fast and efficient on analyzing what happened, how can it
be stopped and finding out what systems are in scope, in order to make the right
choices for the response. Organization C describes that some customers prefer
to engage multiple providers when emergency response services are required.
– Having appropriate staff to provide response to emergency response
calls. MSSPs require having people available to respond when needed. Organi-
zation C advises that providers should be prepared to provide the appropriate
people at the appropriate time, since their staff might be actively engaged in
different tasks. Providers should have at least enough staff for those customers
that have contracted services.
– Reaching global support when system breaches involve global com-
panies. Some companies might have complex systems either in their internal
infrastructure or due to the fusion with other companies. When there is a
breach in global companies or in companies with complex systems, such as
cloud services, it might demand to get the log files involved located in different
countries. Organization A recommends not looking at the whole company, but
first finding the breach and then working the way through it and through the
systems. If there are complex systems involved in the breach, only then global
resources might be required.
– Combine the strategic information and the intelligence. Not all ven-
dors have access to the same multiple sources of intelligence or the knowledge
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on what to do with it. Organization A describes that the quality of the input
that you have access to as a vendor is a big differentiator, but then only by
combining it with strategic information either from history or from experience,
is when meaning can be extracted. Organization E advises that consuming
intelligence will provide detection of the right kind of anomalies and indicators
of compromise to stop targeted attacks.
– Implementing massive security services that will work without false
positives. Many customers want to get security services alerting only about
the real issues and not being alerted by stuff that is not relevant. Organization
A describes that it depends on the quality of the services but this would achieved
once a broader integration of IT, network and security systems occurs.
– Keeping the customers. Customers might switch providers due to not
getting the agreed service or because the service is or becomes too expensive.
Organization A describes that in order to keep a customer it is important to
build a trusted relationship between the provider and the customer.
– Cultural differences might impact the working behaviour. Offshoring
is the relocation of an outsourced service from one country to another that
provides cheaper labor costs. The cultural differences in those outsourcing
destinations might impact the communication and the working behaviour in the
provider’s staff. Organization B explains that having workers with big cultural
differences demands follow up activities and inter-cultural communication in
order to understand the differences and get the job done.
– Unavailable offshore personnel working in countries with natural,
societal or political risk factors. Different circumstances such as natural
disasters, strikes or riots among others might restrict offshore workers to reach
their working place. Organization B describes that having offshore offices
spread over different locations is a good way to spread the risk and not have
an impact on the offshore services provided.
– Remote response enabled by agents. Customer’s IT departments might
be reluctant to use agents because for every incremental bit of complexity on an
endpoint there is potentially a large percentage of customer service calls, help
desk calls, and an increase in the time of evaluating new software or operating
system releases. Organization D and E recommend working with customers to
help convincing their ultimate decision maker as to why the benefit of running
the agent at the endpoint is greater than the cost.
– Lack of skilled personnel. Shortage of people with capabilities for incident
response activities. It is difficult to hire as many people as is needed. Organiza-
tion D advises to hire more junior talent to develop their skills providing them
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with formal training and in-depth hands-on experience. Organization E advises
to create bonds with universities and research groups to find dedicated people
and train them. Organization G recommends offering students a part time job
while they write their thesis. Once the students graduate, organizations can
select those that are skilled and want to keep inside by offering a full time job
position.
– Incident response roles are not clearly defined. Incident response roles
are not clearly defined in the industry, when hiring incident response experts
there is a wide variation of the capabilities, level of experience and expertise
that is needed. Organization D recommends defining internally what these
roles actually are for the company’s needs. It is important to understand, when
hiring new personnel, what they really have experience in and how that is
related to what it is needed at any particular point.
– Different security maturity levels. Customers have different levels of
ability to receive the managed security services. Organization G tries to help its
costumers, with a low level of maturity, by educating them in order to receive
its services more efficiently. It helps these customers to establish a SOC or a
CERT and offers them consultants which could work as part of the customer
team responsible for handling security incidents. For those customers with
better capabilities and more mature level of security, it helps them to establish
an incident response framework and to build tool sets and response exercises.
6.3.3 Post Operation
Customer’s challenges
– Knowledge transition of customer services from one provider to an-
other when a customer changes provider. Providers might be reluctant
to pass knowledge that took many years to get. Some of this knowledge might
not be documented and does not reach the new provider. Organization B
describes that providers might transition the problem knowledge that they are
obliged to but not the rest. Having proper documentation and a continuous
revision of it during the meetings with the customer might help to keep every-
thing documented so that there won’t be any gaps when a provider transition
will occur. Organization D highlights that the new provider should be aware
that the previous provider may not have much incentive to participate on the
process since they are losing a contract. Organization G emphasizes that in
some cases it is needed to educate and train the new people that have been
hired to perform the same services.
Provider’s challenges
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– Understanding the customer needs and expectations when switching
providers. Not understanding the new customer’s expectations and its infras-
tructure could make the transition challenging for the provider receiving the
new costumer and deteriorate the relationship from the beginning. Organization
A emphasizes the importance of getting familiar with the infrastructure both at
the customer and previous provider’s facilities. It is important to understand
what the critical assets are, what does the customer wants to protect and where
the previous provider failed. The more the provider knows about the customer
then the better it would be in shape to provide protection and build a trusted
relationship between the parties. Organization C describes that the provider
needs to understand the new customer’s challenges in order to identify the
services that can be offered in that category and propose something to address
them based on their prior experience.
6.4 What are the future needs for outsourced incident
management and what is lacking from the industry to
make it real?
Organization A highlights the importance of keeping up with the technology, the
misuses of it and being aware of the trends and prices on the dark market. Everyone
needs to be more prepared because those that are misusing the technology are
continuously looking for new vectors of attack.
Organization A emphasizes the need to change the classical computer forensics
into a process that includes identifying, preserving, recovering and analysing evidence
from big data, cloud services and multiple hosts. The industry needs to evolve the
current digital investigations methodology.
Organization A describes that customers want many security services implemented
working without false positives. The industry needs to better integrate IT, network
and security systems.
Organization A recommends to continue contributing on building security aware-
ness and knowledge, there are still a lot of people thinking that they don’t have any
data that someone would be interested in getting. There are some others that are
spending money on services that provide them with more vision on what is happening
but don’t know what to do with that data.
Organization B highlights the importance of inter-cultural communication to
achieve better quality global services.
Organization C outlines that the industry is still lacking better automation and
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better integration to address incidents. More integration of multiple incident response
tools is needed to offer more complete software packages, as well as integration from
software vendor’s products and MSSP’s tools. Threat data and threat intelligence
needs to be better integrated with the tools used for incident handling.
Organization D recommends to switch from the linear NIST incident response
model to a loop concept such as the OODA loop (Section 3.8) to change the efficiency
and effectiveness of processes.
Organization E highlights that the limited supply of skilled personnel needs to be
addressed and the industry should collaborate more effectively with universities to
produce talented people.
Organization F describes that the MSS industry needs to transition from managing
devices to managing the security capability in their customers. MSSPs need to find
the way to make customers understand that what they need is not a set of services
but a managed capability of security in their organization.
Organization G emphasizes that decision makers in the companies don’t have
necessarily abilities to define their own information needs regarding threat intelligence.
They don’t know what threats are they facing, what decisions they need to take and
don’t know what kind of information they need in order to make the right choices.
Customers need to be aware that some MSSPs might offer threat intelligence services
but in reality is just data feed.
Organization G considers that collaboration and information sharing among
MSSPs would benefit the industry.
Expert 1 recommends that instead of trying to detect everything in real time, the
focus should be on trying to detect the things that really matter. Service providers
and companies should focus on detecting systems once they have been compromised
within a certain amount of time but aiming to not let the attackers get to their
ultimate objective. Organization G highlights that as long as security components
involve humans, it can’t do anything in real time. It recommends companies to give
the service provider the ability to handle functions to follow up on incidents 24/7 or
to build functions in-house with the capabilities to do a follow up on incidents 24/7.
Expert 1 believes that providers should have a true intention of enhancing
businesses and making their customer’s businesses more effective; even if that means
that the providers train their customers to take some outsourced services back in
house.
Chapter7Conclusion
Six large managed security service providers (MSSPs) and one emerging MSSP were
studied. These providers were selected based on their leadership in the marketplace,
their suite of IT outsourcing and business process outsourcing security services and
staff dedication to managed security services. Furthermore, an independent expert
provided insights and recommendations on current practices performing incident
management through outsourced services. The independent expert was selected
based on his knowledge and experience as independent security consultant as well as
his experience training on management of incident response teams.
The interviewees have different roles in their respective organizations, this provided
a broader perspective on the challenges including the technical and the business
perspective. The customer and provider’s challenges described in Section 6.3 were
both described by the interviewees. However, none of the interviewees is part
of a client organization. This provides a unilateral perspective on the challenges.
Moreover, only two out of the three categories of MSSPs were interviewed.
7.1 Summary
The interviews revealed some of the challenges that outsourcing incident management
services are currently posing to both customers and providers. Those that can be
highlighted are: identifying the services needed, multiple providers interaction during
an incident, lack of skilled personnel and knowledge transition of customer services
from one provider to another when a customer changes provider.
Most of interviewees outline the lack of agreement on the nature of the services.
A categorization and summary of the current incident management services offered
by the most significant providers in the market was created and presented in section
3.6. The interviewees recommend to evaluate the quality of the services through a
neutral third party.
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Most of the interviewees agree on benefits and disadvantages to existing internal
incident management teams when the partially outsourced model is taken. Some of
the benefits mentioned are: more man-power, specialized services, managerial skills,
a global perspective on threats and multiple sources of intelligence. Some of the
disadvantages are: overlaps when there are not clear lines of responsibility, reduction
of staff.
Most of the interviewees described different ways of handling penalties in SLAs.
Penalties can be dependent on the service outsourced, the environment (production,
test, development), the level of the incident missed, the severity of the attack, and
the consequences for the customer. Moreover, penalties can be charged for exceeding
the number of changes agreed in a given time period, which is consider additional
work that is not budgeted for the customer.
Outsourcing incident management security services is an adequate option to get
competent security for today’s threats. Outsourcing incident management services
might be a good option for small and medium size organizations that don’t require any
unique capabilities. These organizations are benefiting from affordable comprehensive
security without investing in new infrastructure or being burdened by deployment
and management costs.
Large organizations are benefiting by specialized services or by having the chance
to focus on tasks that demand specialized skills instead of repeatable tasks. Tailored
solutions are not easily achieved by outsourced services. It is a complex process that
requires both internal and external staff to accomplish.
A fully outsourced model complemented with internal security experts is described
by Expert 1 as a successful model for outsourcing incident management services.
In this model, in-house security experts would manage the relationships with the
various providers. The internal staff would know who to address in the outsource
company and all the capabilities that the provider offers to them. The security staff
manages all of the functionality but the functionality is all external.
Many of the emerging managed security service providers have been acquired by
bigger companies, not necessarily bigger MSSPs. Ferrara [FMC14] outlines that the
MSSP market has a solid and stable growth. The MSSP market might be attractive
for traditional advisory service consultancies for reasons such as a broader client
base, annuity based contracts and predictable capital that quality MSSPs typically
enjoy. On the other hand, big MSSPs are looking to expand their growth and market
leadership across the globe. This will lead to new acquisitions.
The MSSP market is also becoming a bazaar of services resold by various providers.
Customers need to know which services are being resold to them and prevent clauses
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in the contractual agreements where the provider does not guarantee the security of
the client data when a service from a third party is resold.
The largest MSSPs (enterprise-class) have operations in multiple geographic loca-
tions, commonly in key high-tech locations in low-cost countries. When choosing the
right provider it is important to consider the risks that the operation in those countries
could face as well as how cultural differences can impact the business offshoring the
services. Siepmann [Sie13] describes some of the aspects that should be considered:
society, political stability, economy, crime, environment and infrastructure.
Communicating accurate threat information at a rapid pace will reduce infor-
mation security risks. Collaboration from the public and private sector, including
MSSPs, sharing threat intelligence will benefit everyone in gaining advance notice
about cyber-attacks. Security incident characteristics can be formally described in
a structured manner and shared through numerous security data-sharing options.
Kampanakis [Kam14] summarizes the most prevalent information sharing models
such as Trusted Automated Exchange of Indicator Information (TAXII), Cyber
Observable Expression (CybOX), Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX),
Real-Time Inter-network Defense (RID) and others.
The fundamental building blocks that are used to build technology today don’t
provide the capability of being resilient. More fundamental changes in today’s tech-
nologies are required in order to reach resiliency. Integration with threat intelligence
needs further development. Furthermore, combining threat intelligence with either
the decision making OODA’ cycle or the kill chain life cycle could benefit the de-
fender’s incident handling tasks and improve the holistic situational awareness with
a threat-based active defense.
Hutchins et al. [HCA11] depicts how mapping security controls and procedures
to each stage of the intrusion kill chain model could help developing very detailed,
result-oriented security procedures. Schneier [Sch14] outlines that pulling different
services together under a unified framework like the the Observe, Orient, Decide,
Act (OODA) loop will make incident response work. In a similar manner mapping
the outsourced incident management services to the incident management model
presented in section 3.3 will facilitate the customers finding their needs, and will
provide them with better understanding of what they are lacking to increase the
effectiveness of their organization’s cyber-defense capabilities.
The threat landscape is evolving, and new environments such as mobile, cloud,
Internet of Things (IoT) and Machine to Machine (M2M) are introducing new
challenges. This means that the lack of enough skilled security professionals will
remain a problem also in years to come. Adequate training strategies are required
to reduce the global cybersecurity skills gap. Building a security-minded culture
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will prevent many successful and easily preventable attacks and a security-minded
culture that’s dedicated to constant improvement will improve the cyber-security
personnel skills and attract new talent.
7.2 Further work
Knowledge transition of customer services from one provider to another requires
proper documentation. This documentation is not effectively managed, according to
some of the interviewees, and in some cases there is knowledge that doesn’t reach
the new provider. Therefore exchange formats between providers to transfer the
customer services knowledge could help to guarantee the customers that their data
will be properly handled during and after the transition. A public file format for
exchange of customer services knowledge should be developed to automate as much
of the knowledge transition process as possible. It would make cross-organizational
coordination more efficient and cost effective.
Better visibility of the whole incident management in-house through dashboards
might provide new ways to discuss and share information with everyone involved in the
incident management team, e.g., public affairs office, legal department, management;
in order to increase effectiveness of the organization incident handling process.
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AppendixARequest for participation inresearch project
This section includes the request for participation in research project provided to
the case study participants. This request describes the background and purpose of
the research, briefs the participants about the implications of their participation and
how their information will be treated.
This document is a consent form reported to the Norwegian Social Science Data
services.
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86 A. REQUEST FOR PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH PROJECT
Request for participation in research project 
 "Outsourced Incident Management" 
Background and Purpose 
Nowadays attacks, security environments and organizations have changed due to outsourced 
settings. Therefore new products and services for response are reacting differently. Some 
companies provide outsourced monitoring and management of security devices and systems. 
Outsourcing the incident management seems to be a cost-effective way to satisfy some small 
and large organization’s requirements.  
Outsourcing the incident management comes with a set of challenges. This topic is currently 
not well-explored by researchers, hence further investigations are needed to identify whether 
there are specific challenges on relying on outsourced services for incident management, such 
as prevention, detection and response.  
The project is a Master’s thesis at the NTNU that aims to explore this topic. The sample has 
been selected according to the kind of services outsourced/provided. 
What does participation in the project imply? 
Data will be collected through interviews, the questions will concern: incident management, 
outsourced security services, roles, responsibilities, penalties, challenges. The data collected 
will be collected in audio recordings. 
 
What will happen to the information about you? 
All personal data will be treated confidentially. Personal data will be accessed only by the 
student and supervisors. Personal data/recordings will be stored as encrypted files to ensure 
confidentiality. Participants will not be recognizable in the publication.  
The project is scheduled for completion by 31
st
 May 2015. At that point, personal data and 
any recordings will be securely erased. 
Voluntary participation 
It is voluntary to participate in the project, and you can at any time choose to withdraw your 
consent without stating any reason. If you decide to withdraw, all your personal data will be 
made anonymous. If you have any questions concerning the project, please contact: 
Alfredo Reyes (Student)  alfredor@stud.ntnu.no +47-944 30 063 
Martin G. Jaatun (Supervisor) martin.g.jaatun@sintef.no      +47-900 26 921 
Colin Boyd (Supervisor)  colin.boyd@item.ntnu.no  +47-735 51 758 
The study has been notified to the Data Protection Official for Research, Norwegian Social 
Science Data Services. 
Consent for participation in the study 
I have received information about the project and am willing to participate 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(Signed by participant, date) 
Figure A.1: Request for participation in research project provided to the case study
participants
AppendixBInterview guide
This section presents the interview guide used as a sketch during the remote interviews.
The questionnaire guide during the interviews did not follow any predefined order
to promote a fluent conversation. Elaborations where asked for when needed.
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Outsourced Incident Management   Alfredo Reyes 
Interview guide  
 
 
 
1. What is (are) your role(s) in the organization/company/? 
2. What is your experience with outsourced incident management services? 
3. What are the challenges that organizations are experiencing with outsourced 
incident management services? 
a. Why do these challenges arise? 
b. What can be done to address the challenges? 
4. How do outsourced incident management services benefit or affect current incident 
management teams? 
5. How are roles, responsibilities and penalties described in service level agreements 
between a customer and the outsourced incident management service’s provider? 
6. What is lacking from the industry to address the future needs? 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B.1: Questionnaire guide used during the remote interviews
AppendixCNotification to the NorwegianSocial Science Data Services
This section includes the notification receipt provided by the Norwegian Social Science
Data Services. This receipt describes the estimated end date of the project and how
the data collected would be made anonymous.
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90 C. NOTIFICATION TO THE NORWEGIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA SERVICES
 
Colin Alexander Boyd
Institutt for telematikk  NTNU
 
7491 TRONDHEIM
 
Vår dato: 20.02.2015                         Vår ref: 42023 / 4 / HIT                         Deres dato:                          Deres ref: 
 
 
TILBAKEMELDING PÅ MELDING OM BEHANDLING AV PERSONOPPLYSNINGER
 
Vi viser til melding om behandling av personopplysninger, mottatt 03.02.2015. Meldingen gjelder
prosjektet:
Personvernombudet har vurdert prosjektet og finner at behandlingen av personopplysninger er
meldepliktig i henhold til personopplysningsloven § 31. Behandlingen tilfredsstiller kravene i
personopplysningsloven.
 
Personvernombudets vurdering forutsetter at prosjektet gjennomføres i tråd med opplysningene gitt i
meldeskjemaet, korrespondanse med ombudet, ombudets kommentarer samt
personopplysningsloven og helseregisterloven med forskrifter. Behandlingen av personopplysninger
kan settes i gang.
 
Det gjøres oppmerksom på at det skal gis ny melding dersom behandlingen endres i forhold til de
opplysninger som ligger til grunn for personvernombudets vurdering. Endringsmeldinger gis via et
eget skjema, http://www.nsd.uib.no/personvern/meldeplikt/skjema.html. Det skal også gis melding
etter tre år dersom prosjektet fortsatt pågår. Meldinger skal skje skriftlig til ombudet.
 
Personvernombudet har lagt ut opplysninger om prosjektet i en offentlig database,
http://pvo.nsd.no/prosjekt. 
 
Personvernombudet vil ved prosjektets avslutning, 31.05.2015, rette en henvendelse angående
status for behandlingen av personopplysninger.
 
Vennlig hilsen
Kontaktperson: Hildur Thorarensen tlf: 55 58 26 54
Vedlegg: Prosjektvurdering
42023 Outsourced Incident Management
Behandlingsansvarlig NTNU, ved institusjonens øverste leder
Daglig ansvarlig Colin Alexander Boyd
Student Alfredo Reyes
Katrine Utaaker Segadal
Hildur Thorarensen
Figure C.1: Notification receipt provided by the Norwegian Social Science Data
Services
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AppendixDPaper under review for CloudCom2015 conference
This section includes the paper submitted to the 7th IEEE international conference
on cloud computing technology and science (CloudCom).
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Passing the Buck:
Outsourcing Incident Response Management
Alfredo Ramiro Reyes Zu´n˜iga∗ and Martin Gilje Jaatun†
∗ Department of Telematics, NTNU, Trondheim, Norway
†SINTEF ICT, Trondheim, Norway
Abstract—Many organisations are outsourcing computer oper-
ations to third parties, and the next logical step is to outsource
management of computer security incidents as well. This paper
describes a case study where we have studied several organisa-
tions who are active in this space today. Our results indicate that
outsourcing of incident management is a viable security approach
for many organisations, but that transitioning between providers
frequently is a challenge.
Index Terms—Outsourcing; incident response; security
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s evolving Information and Communication Tech-
nology (ICT) environment requires connecting not only new
applications and devices, but also new providers and partners.
As a result the ICT environment has been gradually outsourced
to third parties, expanding the security perimeter. Some or-
ganizations are moving their ICT infrastructure to the cloud,
where the options for incident response are either null or de-
pending on third parties, with legal and accountability issues.
Moreover, attackers (motivated, skilled and well-funded) are
discovering new attack vectors, while defenders have to take
care of multiple technologies and keeping them and themselves
updated.
Incidents will occur sooner or later, but the important thing
is to detect, contain and eradicate the incident quickly and
effectively to reduce the impact to the organization. How-
ever, organizations under-invest on prevention and suffer from
scarcity of skilled personnel. An evolving threat landscape
and the lack of expertise in many organizations require new
strategies to balance the need to manage incidents effectively.
Some companies provide outsourced monitoring and man-
agement of security devices and systems. Outsourcing inci-
dent management services seems to be a cost-effective way
to satisfy some organizations’ requirements. These kinds of
providers are able to see a big picture view, by using the
knowledge acquired by their solutions as their advantage.
A. Participants
The participant organizations is this study are transnational
organizations selected based on the managed security service
provider’s (MSSP) market presence. Five large MSSPs con-
tributed to the interviews.
B. Paper Structure
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: We
present related work in Section II, and elaborate on relevant
standards in Section III. We provide more background on
incident management in Section IV, and present our results
in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The term incident management refers to the actions and
mechanisms used to manage information security incidents.
It is used to describe the collection of tasks involved with
the incident response life-cycle. These tasks include plan and
prepare for, detection and reporting, assessment and decision,
responses, and lessons learnt to prevent future incidents.
Different standards, guidelines and frameworks have direct
and indirect remarks on incident management. Those that
are most notable among the information security community
are: NIST SP 800-61 [1], ISO/IEC 27035 [2], ENISA Good
Practice Guide for Incident Management [3] and ITIL [4].
These standards, guidelines and frameworks will be described
in Section III.
Siepmann [5] describes outsourcing as contracting out ser-
vices, previously performed internally, to a third party. Both
the third party and the organization contracting out the services
take part in a contractual agreement that involves payments,
and exchange of services.
A great amount of academic literature related to incident
management and managed security services (MSS) has been
published. Nevertheless, the literature focused on outsourced
incident management services is scarce. Siepmann [5] presents
an analysis on security and privacy impacts when outsourcing
Information Technology (IT) processes as well as recommen-
dations on outsourcing preparation. Sherwood [6] studied the
concerns regarding security of information within outsourced
settings. The study presents a strategy to manage information
security on outsourced technical services.
The study performed by Tøndel et al. [7] on current prac-
tices and experiences with incident management, identified the
practice of incident management in outsourcing scenarios as
one of the challenges for incident management. In accordance
with their study, there is a need for improved understanding
of the challenges of incident response in outsourcing scenar-
ios particularly when several suppliers are serving the same
customer.
Maj et al. [3] discuss the outsourcing of incident manage-
ment from the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT1)
point of view. They suggest hiring the right people to guide
the outsourcing process since it is a challenging project that
should not be underestimated. Maj et al. recommend keeping
control over the incident handling services and not outsource
those elements of incident handling that provide control such
as incident reports, registration, triage (including verification
and classification) and the overall coordination of incident
resolution. Some of the reasons given to outsource incident
management related services are [3], [8] :
• Cost.
• Difficulties in hiring, training and retaining staff.
• Services you might not want to provide yourself.
• Physically hardened facilities with latest infrastructure.
• Enterprise-wide management of security strategy.
• Access to threat and countermeasure information.
• Global prosecution.
• Service performance 24x7.
There is a need for research on the topic of outsourced
incident management services since related information is
scarce [9]. Siepmann’s work [5] addresses management of
information security incidents but his comments are only
considered on managing incidents in outsourcing settings and
not managed by a trusted third party outsourcing the services.
Sherwood’s study on management of security on outsourc-
ing contracts [6], does not have an assessment on incident
management. Tøndel et al.’s study on current practices and
experiences with incident management [7] does not describe
any outsourced incident management experiences or practices.
The good practice guide for incident management published
by Maj et al. [3] only addresses outsourcing of incident
management from the CERT’s perspective.
III. STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES
This section introduces some standards containing informa-
tion regarding incident management.
A. NIST Special Publication 800-61
This standard [1] aims to assist organizations in mitigating
risks from computer security incidents by providing guid-
ance on establishing incident response capabilities. It includes
guidelines on building incident management capabilities and
the interaction with external parties, such as vendors or Com-
puter Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT).
NIST SP 800-61 describes in detail the four major phases of
the incident response life cycle. These phases are (see Fig. ??):
• Preparation.
• Detection and Analysis.
1The term CERT was used for the first time by the Computer Emergency
Response Team Coordination Center (CERT-CC) at Carnegie Mellon Univer-
sity. Some teams around the world took the CERT term and other teams used
the term Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) to point out the
task of handling computer security incidents instead of other technical support
work. The terms CERT, CSIRT, Incident Response Team (IRT), Computer
Incident Response Team (CIRT) and Security Emergency Response Team
(SERT) have been used interchangeably in the literature to refer to teams that
aim to mitigate the impact of a potential major information security incident.
• Containment, Eradication and Recovery.
• Post-Incident Activity.
B. ISO/IEC 27035:2011 Information security incident man-
agement
This standard [2] provides guidance to incident manage-
ment. It offers a structured approach to deal with incidents
including planning, detecting, responding and thereafter ex-
tracting lessons learnt. ISO/IEC 27035:2011 presents five
phases with recommended activities. These phases are:
• Plan and Prepare.
• Detection and Reporting.
• Assessment and Detection.
• Responses.
• Lessons learnt.
ISO 27035 aims to assist organizations in satisfying the
requirements for establishing, implementing, maintaining and
continually improving an Information Security Management
System (ISMS) specified in ISO/IEC 27001:2013 [10]. ISO
27035 provides guidelines on the implementation of good
practices on information security management presented in the
standard ISO/IEC 27002:2013 [11].
C. ENISA - Good Practice Guide for Incident Management
ENISAs guide [3] provides guidelines for security incident
management. It provides recommendations on the creation of
a CERT and assists on preparing its mission, constituency,
responsibility, mandate organizational framework and the type
of services, in terms of the incident management process, that
can deliver.
This guide highlights the incident handling process, and
provides related information on roles, workflows and policies.
ENISA’s guide pays no attention to the preparation phase and
focuses on the incident handling process composed by four
phases: detection, triage, analysis and incident response.
D. The ITIL Framework
The ITIL framework [4] is a source of good practice
for service management that focuses on aligning IT services
with the needs of the organization. The main goals of the
incident management lifecycle are to reestablish a normal
service as fast as possible and to reduce unfavorable impact on
business operations. During the incident management process,
resources are assigned to different activities such as identi-
fication, registration, categorization, prioritization, diagnosis,
escalation, investigation, resolution, recovery, and incident
closure, in order to mitigate and minimize the impact of
incidents. The incident management process can be triggered
by incident reports coming from diverse sources.
IV. INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
There is a lack of consistency in defining incident manage-
ment across the standards and guidelines as well as in the in-
formation security literature. The terms incident management,
incident handling and incident response are in some cases used
interchangeably. However, these terms have a different scope.
Fig. 1: Incident Management, Incident Handling and Incident
Response relationship
TABLE I: Incident management models [9]
Capabilities
Organization side Provider side Outsourced
Execution
Full-time Full-time Partially outsourced
Part-time Part-time Fully outsourced
Virtual team Virtual team
Incident management is part of a comprehensive security
programme for information security governance [3] [12]. Kill-
crece et al. [13], emphasize that incident management is not
purely an IT issue, but a wide overview of the organization’s
security, risk and IT management functions. Alberts et al.
[14] explains that incident management encompasses incident
handling, incident response and a larger set of activities such
as vulnerability handling, artefact handling, security awareness
training as well as other proactive services and security quality
management services.
Chichonski et al. [1] and Maj et al. [3] present Incident
handling as a whole lifecycle where incident response is one of
the phases. Incident response is an organized approach to react
to a security breach or attack. The goal is to contain, eradicate
and recover from the situation in a way that limits damage
and reduces recovery time and costs. Fig. 1 explains the
relationship between incident management, incident handling
and incident response.
A. Incident management models
Reyes [9] classified the incident management models ac-
cording to an organization’s capabilities, human resources and
expertise (See Table I). The outsourced incident management
model is usually followed by organizations focused on their
core activities or by organizations looking for cost reductions.
The focus of this paper is on the outsourced incident manage-
ment model.
The incident management could be partially or fully out-
sourced in this model. Selecting a partially outsourced ap-
proach could be based on the lack of certain expertise or when
is more convenient to use a third party to provide a particular
service. On the other hand, fully outsourcing incident man-
agement would be an option for those organizations that want
to focus uniquely and completely on their core services and
rather outsource anything else.
B. Managed Security Service Provider
Outsourcing incident management services is not an option
that all organizations would consider, since it may be perceived
as providing control and access to the digital assets. However,
outsourcing incident management services is all about a secu-
rity partnership with one or more trusted third parties.
Managed Security Service Providers supply organizations
with expert teams and systems, improvement in performance,
reduction in capital investment technology and resources, and
meticulous activities to exhibit to auditors and regulators.
Depending on the contracted services, MSSPs are able to
provide support to the organization or (if existent) the organi-
zation’s incident management team to manage incidents and
to supplement or support the existing security infrastructure.
Ferrara and Hayes [15] categorized MSSPs in three cate-
gories, based on their size and capabilities. The first category
involves the largest enterprise-class providers. These MSSPs
provide multiple security operation centres (SOCs) in multiple
geographic locations, proprietary or significant enhanced tech-
nology, full portfolio of standard services and multi-language
support. The second category has the emerging MSSPs. These
MSSPs have one or two SOCs, significantly enhanced tech-
nology, full portfolio of services and language support in one
to two languages. Finally, the third category includes many
smaller firms that serve the small business market. These
companies have a single SOC, no threat intelligence services
unless reselling another company’s service, narrow portfolio
of services and support in a single language.
V. RESULTS
This section presents findings from the case study. The col-
lected data was prepared in a common format and categorized
based on key themes.
The findings are organized based on three different stages:
Pre-operation, Operation and Post-operation. Pre-operation
refers to the stage where an organization has not created a
contract with any provider to acquire incident management ser-
vices. Operation describes the stage where there is an ongoing
contract between the customer and the provider to outsource
any kind of incident management services. Finally, the Post-
operation stage deals with a normal contract completion or an
early termination.
Organization A describes that good communication with
internal incident management teams depends on the customer’s
forensic readiness, meaning that the customer is prepared and
the stakeholders are involved in the case. If there is not a
proper working model in the internal incident management
team, there might be communication conflicts due to a lack of
internal communication.
A customer that has security controls in place, trains its
people, has implemented security awareness and knows what
might be the threats gets more benefit of the outsourced
incident management services. Organization E describes that
when internal incident management teams are mature and
self-sufficient, they look for assistance in services that are
too complex. Organization A and C explain that outsourced
incident management services could benefit an internal inci-
dent management team by providing it with more man-power,
specialized services, managerial skills, a global perspective on
threats and multiple sources of intelligence. However, in some
cases it might affect internal teams that are trying to respond
in the same manner if there are not clear lines of responsibility
in terms of which team does what type of tasks. Besides some
internal incident management teams might get affected by a
reduction of staff.
Organization B comments that current incident management
teams benefit from participating on discussions and inputs
coming from the provider getting a different perspective in
order to make decisions and reach agreements to deal with an
incident.
Organization D highlights that some internal incident man-
agement teams might perceive the MSSPs as the help needed
to prevent being fired when an incident is out of control.
Organizations A and D describe that they offer different
types of SLAs in terms of different services. Organization
A’s responsibilities and penalties are dependent on what the
customer is looking for and is willing to pay. The penalties
differentiate on what services are outsourced, traditional man-
aged security services or managed incident handling services,
the level of the incident missed and the severity of the attack.
Organization B explains that the roles and responsibilities
are dependent on what the client wants, the higher the SLAs
the more they have to pay because it requires more staff. Or-
ganization B offers different types of SLA’s not only in terms
of different services but also according to the environment
(production, test, development, etc.). The SLAs related with
the production environment have higher cost and penalties
than the rest of the environments. The penalties at the SLAs
might differ from account to account. However, Organization
B has compensation agreements, meaning that if an SLA is
missed and there is a penalty, the compensation agreement
could be used in order to condone the penalty as long as the
compensation agreement is achieved.
Organization C has very specific SLAs for incident reporting
or detection. If there is an incident or suspected incident,
there is an escalation process to notify the customer, which is
done by phone or by other means, based on its severity. But
Organization C uses a different set of SLAs when it comes to
incident response. Responsibilities and penalties are dependent
on what is being offered and what the consequences are for
the customer.
Organization E considers that there is no way to promise
some customer that the provider’s resources will be on site
within a very specific amount of time. Everything is done
of best effort and there are no artificial time limits. There
is no way that a provider can promise to get to the bottom
of something in an investigation in a certain period of time
because each situation is different. It is hard to state SLAs
because there is no level of predictability in these kinds of
situations.
A. Pre-Operation
1) Identifying the services needed.: Many of the services
are named differently by different providers which makes it
more difficult for non-security aware costumers to find out
the right services. Organization A recommends to make an
in depth search of the services and then get an independent
view from a third party, helping to understand what their
strengths and weaknesses are and what might be suitable
for the company. Organization C recommends that providers
should be clear about where these services are located in
the incident management process, where the starting point
is, where the ending point is and what are the resources
required from the customer in order to implement the services.
Organization D recommends providers to devote time helping
potential clients to understand how what they are doing is
different from what others do and what some of the differences
in their proposal are.
2) Choosing the right provider.: Companies are not aware
of the broad diversity of providers that can offer to them
incident management services. Organization A advises the
companies to have a subscription or a working relationship
with an analyst company or a neutral third party in order to
get an independent view of the providers, helping to under-
stand the MSSP market segmentation, provider’s capabilities,
flexibility and customer satisfaction.
3) Taking into consideration the staff morale.: The staff
morale might be affected by the decision of outsourcing
services that were previously run in-house. Organization B
recommends involving the staff, and making them understand
why the decision was made and try to make it positive.
4) Adapting to a foreign language communication when
using global outsourced services.: Outsourcing services to
global companies might impact the internal communication,
since the staff might not be used to talking to people in
another language such as English. Organization B recommends
taking the internal communication into account when choosing
a service provider.
5) Predicting resources and justifying them inside the busi-
ness.: Customers may have a very difficult time predicting
how much resources or help they are going to need and
justifying it within their business. Organization E advises to
take advantage of cyber-attacks reported in newspapers as
headlines or in the news to make justifications easier.
B. Operation
1) Providing emergency response services to new cus-
tomers.: Emergency response services are those that com-
panies can call to during 24 hours every day of the year
when they have an emergency. Organization A advises that
experienced security professionals which have developed their
skills through different cases are the most suitable to provide
help quickly in an unknown infrastructure, being fast and
efficient on analyzing what happened, how can it be stopped
and finding out what systems are in scope, in order to make
the right choices for the response. Organization C describes
that some customers prefer to engage multiple providers when
emergency response services are required.
2) Having appropriate staff to provide response to emer-
gency response calls.: MSSPs require having people available
to respond when needed. Organization C advises that providers
should be prepared to provide the appropriate people at the
appropriate time, since their staff might be actively engaged
in different tasks. Providers should have at least enough staff
for those costumers that have contracted services.
3) Communication between external and internal incident
management teams.: Internal communication within an inci-
dent where clear roles and communication mechanisms have
not been established in the internal incident management team
can cause communication conflicts. Organization A describes
that it is important that the customers have developed some
forensic readiness and incident management planning describ-
ing IRT roles and responsibilities.
4) Reaching global support when system breaches involve
global companies.: Some companies might have complex
systems either in their internal infrastructure or due to the
fusion with other companies. When there is a breach in global
companies or in companies with complex systems, such as
cloud services, it might demand to get the log files involved
located in different countries. Organization A recommends not
looking at the whole company, but first finding the breach and
then working the way through it and through the systems. If
there are complex systems involved in the breach, only then
global resources might be required.
5) Combine the strategic information and the intelligence.:
Not all vendors have access to the same multiple sources
of intelligence or the knowledge on what to do with it.
Organization A describes that the quality of the input that
you have access to as a vendor is a big differentiator, but
then only by combining it with strategic information either
from history or from experience, is when meaning can be
extracted. Organization E advises that consuming intelligence
will provide with detection of the right kind of anomalies and
indicators of compromise to stop targeted attacks.
6) Implementing massive security services that will work
without false positives.: Many customers want to get security
services alerting only about the real issues and not being
alerted by stuff that is not relevant. Organization A describes
that it depends on the quality of the services but this would
achieved once a broader integration of IT, network and security
systems occurs.
7) Keeping the customers.: Customers might switch
providers due to not getting the agreed service or because the
service is or becomes too expensive. Organization A describes
that in order to keep a customer it is important to build a
trusted relationship between the provider and the customer.
8) Cultural differences might impact the working be-
haviour.: Offshoring is the relocation of an outsourced service
from one country to another that provides cheaper labor costs.
The cultural differences in those outsourcing destinations
might impact the communication and the working behaviour
in the provider’s staff. Organization B explains that having
workers with big cultural differences demand follow up activ-
ities and inter-cultural communication in order to understand
the differences and get the job done.
9) Unavailable offshore personnel working in countries
with natural, societal or political risk factors.: Different
circumstances such as natural disasters, strikes or riots among
others might restrict offshore workers to reach their working
place. Organization B describes that having offshore offices
spread over different locations is a good way to spread the
risk and not have an impact on the offshore services provided.
10) Multiple providers interaction during an incident.:
Customers may have multiple providers supporting the same
incident which, even if they are assigned to do different tasks,
can have some overlap. Organization C recommends that there
should be some hierarchy involved when multiple providers
are engaged in the same incident, to make sure that somebody
is in charge and perhaps solve overlapping tasks. Organization
E describes that the customer should be the one dictating how
the investigation would be done and defining the separation of
duties to be handled by the companies that are brought in.
11) Collecting logs from systems and infrastructure.:
Customers might not be logging what is happening in their
infrastructure. The use of logs is something that does not
necessarily require many resources, but it provides great help
when having an incident. Organization D advises to collect
sufficient logs and data in order to facilitate and improve the
customer’s incident response process. This will allow verifying
the information of an incident and would significantly speed
the provider’s response enabling some response functions to
be performed remotely.
12) Remote response enabled by agents.: Customer’s IT
departments might be reluctant to the use of agents because
for every incremental bit of complexity on an endpoint there is
potentially a large percentage of customer service calls, help
desk calls, and an increase on the time of evaluating new
software or operating system releases. Organization D and E
recommend working with customers to help convincing their
ultimate decision maker as to why the benefit of running the
agent at the endpoint is greater than the cost.
13) Lack of skilled personnel.: Shortage of people with
capabilities for incident response activities. It is difficult to
hire as many people as is needed. Organization D advises
to hire more junior talent to develop their skills providing
them with formal training and in-depth hands-on experience.
Organization E advises to create bonds with universities and
research groups to find dedicated people and train them.
14) Incident response roles are not clearly defined.: In-
cident response roles are not clearly defined in the industry,
when hiring incident response experts there is a wide variation
of the capabilities, level of experience and expertise that is
needed. Organization D recommends defining internally what
these roles actually are for the company’s needs. It is important
to understand, when hiring new personnel, what they really
have experience in and how that is related to what it is needed
at any particular point.
C. Post-Operation
1) Understanding the customer needs and expectations
when switching providers.: Not understanding the new cus-
tomer’s expectations and its infrastructure could make the
transition challenging for the provider receiving the new
costumer and deteriorate the relationship from the beginning.
Organization A emphasizes the importance of getting familiar
with the infrastructure both at the customer and previous
provider’s facilities. It is important to understand what the
critical assets are, what does the customer wants to protect
and where the previous provider failed. The more the provider
knows about the customer then the better it would be in shape
to provide protection and build a trusted relationship between
the parties. Organization C describes that the provider needs to
understand the new customer’s challenges in order to identify
the services that can be offered in that category and propose
something to address them based on their prior experience.
2) Knowledge transition of customer services from one
provider to another when a customer changes provider.:
Providers might be reluctant to pass knowledge that took many
years to get. Some of this knowledge might not be documented
and does not reach the new provider. Organization B describes
that providers might transition the problem knowledge that
they are obliged to but not the rest. Having a proper docu-
mentation and a continuous revision of it during the meetings
with the customer might help to keep everything documented
so that there won’t be any gaps when a provider transition
will occur. Organization D highlights that the new provider
should be aware that the previous provider may not have much
incentive to participate on the process since they are losing a
contract.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has described interviews with five large managed
security service providers (MSSPs) in the global market.
Outsourcing incident management security services is a
viable option to get security competence for responding to
today’s threats. Outsourcing incident management services
seems to be a good option for small and medium size organiza-
tions that don’t require tailored services. These organizations
can reap affordable comprehensive security without investing
in new infrastructure or being burdened by deployment and
management costs. Large organizations are benefiting by spe-
cialized services or by having the chance to focus on tasks that
demand specialized skills instead of repeatable tasks. Tailored
solutions are not easily achieved by outsourced services. It is a
complex process that requires both internal and external staff
to accomplish.
All organizations can evaluate and assess what MSSPs offer
according to their needs. However, the service’s descriptions
at the provider’s websites are unclear and most of the times
confusing. Mapping those services to either the incident
management model, the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA)
decision-making life-cycle phases, or the kill chain framework
phases will enable better understanding of what the customers
are lacking to increase the effectiveness of their organizational
cyber-defense capabilities.
Knowledge transition of customer services from one
provider to another requires proper documentation. This docu-
mentation is not effectively done, according to some of the in-
terviewees, and in some cases there is knowledge that doesn’t
reach the new provider. Therefore exchange formats between
providers to transfer the customer services knowledge could
help to guarantee the customers that their data will be properly
handled during and after the transition. A public file format for
exchange of customer services knowledge should be developed
to automate as much of the knowledge transition process
as possible. It would make cross-organizational coordination
more efficient and cost effective.
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